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“The bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is
before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding, go out to
meet it.” Thucydides 1
I. INTRODUCTION
When social and legal commentators explore the topic of same-sex
couples’ rights, 2 the media frames the discussion using the historical
underpinnings of the arguments of each side. In what is an extremely
gray area, there are black and white lines drawn. The inherent morality,
intertwined into this discussion, creates a barrier for examining the
underlying assumptions. The challenge to that morality, rather than the
challenge to data, plays to the fundamental human desire to resist
change. 3
The current discussion is framed as follows. Those who support
the establishment of laws preventing same-sex couples from marrying
and adopting essentially base their argument on either religious
justification (prohibited in Leviticus), 4 economic justification (the
1. THUCYDIDES, THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Sir Richard Winn Livingstone
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1960).
2. For the purposes of this Article, there will not be a distinction between gay men, lesbians,
bisexuals, transsexuals, or transgenders.
The distinctions between the aforementioned
classifications are unimportant for the discussion of the current legislation. For a thoughtful
discussion of the distinctions between the categories, see GENDER NONCONFORMITY, RACE AND
SEXUALITY (Toni Lester ed., 2002) [hereinafter LESTER]. The concept that all human beings are
either male or female is also outside the scope the Article. For a detailed discussion of what it
means to be female, see Christopher Clarey & Gina Kolata, Gold Awarded Amid Dispute over
Aug.
20,
2009,
available
at
Runner’s
Sex,
N.Y.
TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/21/sports/21runner.html?scp=1&sq=woman%20sports%20runner&st=c
ase (“Medical experts said assigning sex was hardly as easy as sizing someone up visually.”); Julie
A. Greenberg, Definitional Dilemmas, Male or Female? Black or White? The Law’s Failure to
Recognize Intersexuals and Multiracials, in LESTER, supra, at 102–24 (“Originally, legal
classification systems based upon race and sex operated on the assumptions that (1) race and sex are
binary, and (2) race and sex can be biologically determined.”).
3. EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 365 (5th ed. 2003) (“One of the
greatest pains to human nature is the pain of a new idea. It . . . makes you think that after all, your
favorite notions may be wrong, your firmest beliefs ill-founded . . . . Naturally, therefore, common
men hate a new idea, and are disposed more or less to ill-treat the original man who brings it.”
(quoting WALTER BAGEHOT, PHYSICS AND POLITICS (1873))).
4. See Leviticus 18:22 (King James) (“Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind:
it is abomination.”). However, it is never brought to bear the other admonishments of Leviticus.
For example, these other acts are banned: tattoos (Leviticus 19:28), eating pork or shell fish
(Leviticus 11:3-8), and stoning blasphemers (Leviticus 24:10-23). Moreover, holidays, such as Yom
Kippur ()יוֹםכִּפּוּר, are required to be observed. Leviticus 16:29, 23:27. The topic over which laws in
Leviticus to obey is a complicated discussion and far outside the scope of this Article. Due to the
antinomianism of passages, such as Paul’s 1 Corinthians 10:23-26, most current Christians,
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recognition will either cost the country money or will use my tax dollars
for a nefarious purpose), 5 or on a lack of evidence regarding the choice
element. 6 Those who support the establishment of laws requiring equal
protection, or at least eliminating animus-based legislation, base their
argument on the right to lead a life free from discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 7 More specifically, regarding same sex-couple
marriages, analogies are drawn between the elimination of antimiscegenistic legislation and the current plight of same-sex couples. 8

generally, divide Leviticus into two sections: the morality codes (e.g., do not send your daughter
out for prostitution) and Mosaic Law (e.g., ritualistic circumcision). The discussion of the religious
recognition of the right to marriage for same-sex couples is outside the scope of this Article,
because the Article only addresses state marriage laws, which are not the same as religious marriage
laws. For a thoughtful series of articles on the topic, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, ANTHONY R.
PICARELLO, JR. & ROBIN FRETWELL WILSON, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, THE
BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (2008); Jay Michaelson, Chaos, Law, and God: The
Religious Meanings of Homosexuality, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 41 (2008).
5. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010), commonly referred to as the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”).
In the House Report, purpose (4) states that DOMA will protect scarce government resources. Pub.
L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419. See also Associated Press, Steele: Gay Marriage Costs Small
Business, WASH. TIMES, May 17, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/
may/17/gay-marriage-called-burden-on-business/ (“Republicans can reach a broader base by
recasting gay marriage as an issue that could dent pocketbooks as small businesses spend more on
health care and other benefits, Republican National Committee Chairman Michael S. Steele said
Saturday.”). For the full discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
6. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Biological Causes and Consequences of Homosexual
Behavior and Their Relevance for Family Law Policies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 997 (2007); cf.
LESTER, supra note 2, at 102–24.
7. The question which will permeate this Article is: why marriage? Not all gay and lesbian
rights advocates believe marriage is the answer. Some argue that marriage is contrary to main
messages of the lesbian and gay movement of affirmation of gay identity and of many forms of
relationships. Some argue that it signifies social acceptance. But to answer the question, why
marriage, it is because as long as marriage is the basis for rights, equal access should be granted.
See AMY D. RONNER, HOMOPHOBIA AND THE LAW 29–31 (2005). However, it is the
aforementioned idea that there is some form of social acceptance or validation that is most troubling
for the opposition. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 574-75 (1995) (“[A] contingent marching behind the organization’s banner would at least bear
witness to the fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized
marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much claim to
unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals . . . .”); John G. Culhane, Marriage, Tort, and
Private Ordering: Rhetoric and Reality in LGBT Rights, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 437 (2009). Cf.
Marc Poirier, Name Calling: Identifying Stigma in “Civil Union”/”Marriage” Distinction, 41
CONN. L. REV. 1425 (2009) (focusing on the Connecticut marriage equality case and the concept
that civil unions reinforce a preexisting sense of second class status, which violates the Equal
Protection Clause).
8. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Blurring of the Lines: Children and Bans on Interracial
Unions and Same-Sex Marriages, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2733, 2736 (2008) (“My contention is that
both antimiscegenation statutes and bans against same-sex marriage have been used to construct and
reify essentialized and dualistic understandings of race and sex/gender.”); Elizabeth F. Emens,
Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV.
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Rather than focusing on a dissertation between the two moralities
(Judeo-Christian vs. anti-miscegenation), this Article will review the
current law and try to forecast the direction in which the law is moving.
This Article will instead focus on the topic of why the elimination of
DOMA, examined through a sociological perspective, is inevitable.9
The concept that any change occurs through a process of enlightenment
of ignorance 10 followed by acceptance is the premise of this paper. The
interests of the party accepting change are best served by the
sociological principle that change is fundamental.11
In order to better frame the discussion, alternative approaches must
be explored. The purpose of this Article is to expand the scope of the
discussion from one of morality to include a sociological approach,
called Diffusion Theory. 12 Diffusion Theory is most often applied to
situations where a new idea or product is introduced to help determine

1307, 1389 (2009); Holning Lau, Formalism: From Racial Integration to Same-Sex Marriage, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 843 (2008); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Anti-Miscegenation
Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (2008) (“Conversations about
the constitutionality of prohibitions on marriage for same-sex couples invariably reduce to the
question of whether a meaningful analogy can be drawn between restrictions on same-sex marriage
and anti-miscegenation laws.”); Josephine Ross, Riddle for Our Times: The Continued Refusal to
Apply the Miscegenation Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 999, 1009-10 (2002)
(“Same-sex marriage cases are a logical extension of the principles of Loving v. Virginia, for both
its holdings: (1) Even though the statute effects [sic] African-Americans and whites, it still
constitutes a racial classification which must be justified under a higher burden of proof; and (2)
There is a fundamental right to marry.”).
9. Economic theory is utilized in various discriminatory applications of statutory schemes.
However, it is often underutilized for “civil rights practitioners that can help predict how different
causal theories (animus versus statistical discrimination) and different government remedies
(affirmative actions quotas versus bidding credits) affect private behavior.” IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE
PREJUDICE? 13 (2001).
10. For a thoughtful analysis of the myths that surround homophobia, see generally RONNER,
supra note 7, at 4–7 (discussing the multiple stereotypes that can either stand alone or commingle
including: (1) “emblem of a dangerous criminality” (Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986));
(2) equating “the homosexual with physical illness—not just any illness—but something especially
vile and loathsome”; and (3) “a lifestyle antithetical to marriage and family.”). See also Nancy J.
Knauer, LGBT Elder Law: Toward Equity in Aging, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 34-37 (2009);
Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United States’ Immigration Law as
Applied to Bi-National Same-Sex Couples: Making the Case for the Uniting American Families
Act, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 306-07 (2009) (discussing the myths that homosexuals are
“pied pipers” who recruit others into the fold and as molesters of children); Michaelson, supra note
4.
11. See ROGERS, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that information reduces uncertainty about causeeffect relationship in problem solving: “When new ideas are invented, diffused and are adopted or
rejected, leading to certain consequences social change occurs.”).
12. See generally id.; MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000).
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how or why people either choose to adapt or reject the proposed
change. 13
The premise of Diffusion Theory is that the adaptation of a new
idea or product depends on the message, the messenger, and the ability
to effectively reach the target audience, with the underlying assumption
that people or societal groups resist change. 14 In order to have effective
change the advocate change agents must have others empathize with
their position. Whether challengers of DOMA have achieved this level
of empathy is the question addressed in this paper.
Within one month, two major district court decisions were handed
down upholding the first serious challenges to DOMA. 15 The courts
struck down DOMA and a state marriage ban under a rational basis
review. 16 In other words, there is no legitimate government interest
regarding this type of legislation. Clearly both cases will be appealed,
but do these cases indicate a successful change agent under Diffusion
Theory?
The current legal challenges to the constitutionality of DOMA
suggest that a heightened constitutional standard should be used in
analyzing the statute. 17 The argument is if a disproportionate impact on
a class of individuals, e.g., same-sex couples, exists, this creates a
suspect classification. If a suspect classification is granted, DOMA or
other state marriage statutes would be subject to strict scrutiny and, in all
probability, would be held unconstitutional. 18 This would be a simple
solution to the problematic enactment of DOMA.
A strict scrutiny approach appears unlikely to carry the day based
on recent court trends. 19 It is not likely that the Court will add another

13. ROGERS, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 365.
15. Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass.
2010); Perry v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (upholding a challenge
to Proposition 8).
16. Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass.
2010).
17. Heightened standards under the Due Process Clause are reserved to rights “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty” or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
18. The three basic classifications of a suspect class are those classifications that reflect
“deep-seated prejudice,” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982), those that discriminate
against a group that has been “subjected to . . . a history of purposeful unequal treatment,” San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973), or those that inhibit a group that
tends to be relegated to “a position of political powerlessness.” Id. at 28.
19. In fact, the Supreme Court has already stated that the Due Process Clause does apply to
homosexual sodomy. See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 476 U.S. 186 (1986).
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suspect class. 20 The overwhelming movement of the Court has been to
reduce the applicability of the strict scrutiny standard to existing suspect
classifications.
It seems rather naïve and pedantic for advocates to bank on a
complete reversal of current Court trends. Clearly, same-sex couples
have endured decades of prejudicial treatment. Further, in the author’s
opinion, only a failure of the fourth prong of political powerlessness
would prevent same-sex couples for eligibility of heightened scrutiny. 21
If it is clear that the Court will not grant suspect classification or other
heightened scrutiny to same-sex couples, the ruling on DOMA will be
governed by the rational basis standard.
In order to have DOMA upheld using a rational basis standard, the
government must prove that there is a rational correlation between the
statute and the government’s interest. What Diffusion Theory can show
is that when the majority empathizes with the minority, there will no
longer be a rational correlation between the statute and the interest. In
order to effectuate change, a change agent must first communicate the
idea that there is a group deserving of redress. That fundamental
principle is what Diffusion Theory teaches. That same principle was the
outline of the successful Florida attacks in the same-sex couple adoption
cases. 22

20. Historically, the heightened review standard has been applied to classes that had no
political voice. Gender classifications became subject to the intermediate standard in Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Racial classifications became subject to the standard in Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967), and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964).
Religious classifications have become subject to the standard in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
406 (1963). In 1990, the Supreme Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that a neutral,
generally applicable law is entitled to deferential rational basis review, even if the law prohibits
conduct central to an individual’s religion. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885-87 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, as recognized in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709 (2005). National origin became subject to the standard in Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633,
644-46 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Sexuality has not been held
to this standard, except in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Further, groups like nonimmigrant aliens are not afforded the heightened scrutiny. See LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523,
533 (6th Cir. 2007); LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 417-19 (5th Cir. 2005); see generally Patricia
A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481 (2009); Kenji Yoshino,
The Gay Tipping Point, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1537 (2010); Tobias Wolff, Interest Analysis in
Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2246-47 (2005).
21. Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986). Yoshino, supra note 20, at 1537 (“The gay tipping
point raises the question whether gay individuals are still a politically powerless minority deserving
of judicial protection in this country.”).
22. In re Adoption of John Doe, 2008 WL 5070056 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008); In re
Adoption of John and James Doe, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
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Thus to determine the likely outcome in a diffusion approach, it is
necessary to look at statistical trends, whether the message can be
modified, and whether this modified message can be effectively
delivered. Through message adoption, as evidenced by the Florida
cases, DOMA can be equally attacked. Diffusion Theory allows us to
examine how change was effectuated in Florida and how similar change
can occur under DOMA.
Examining the topic through the aforementioned lens, an interesting
conclusion begins to develop, demonstrating that the outcome of
fundamental fairness seems to be settled. The current statistical trends,
population age density, and voting tendencies on the issue indicate that a
different result should soon appear. 23 This Article will draw on how age
differences, adaptation of the messages, and technological changes
indicate that, if left to its own devices, sexual discriminatory legislation
is destined to fail.
It is important to look at the topic because there are collateral
consequences. 24 The rights in question affect not only same-sex
couples, but also their children. 25
Section II of this Article explains Diffusion Theory. Section III
explores the background of DOMA and the factual background in which
DOMA is being challenged by the states and private citizens. Section
IV discusses the fundamentals behind the Florida adoption ban and how
the change in the message by the challengers has proven effective. The
final part, Section V, analyzes whether the approach should center on the
inevitability of the change, as reflected in the Justice Department’s brief.
The justification by the government, both at the state and national level,

23. See also OVID, PUBLIUS OVIDIUS NASO (“There is nothing in the whole world which is
permanent. Everything flows onward; all things are brought into being with a changing nature; the
ages themselves glide by in constant movement.”).
24. Not least among these consequences is the tax impact of having to pay extra income and
payroll taxes and additional health insurance costs. See generally Cain, supra note 20. Further, in
the event that there is an estate tax, under current rules, even if you are married for state law
purposes, the marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2056 is unavailable for the surviving spouse. Id. at
499. See also Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV.
129, 173 (1998) (“This option is not available to same-sex couples. Transfers between same-sex
partners do not qualify for the unlimited marital deduction.”). Moreover, from an income tax
perspective, the failure of DOMA to recognize the valid state law marriage for tax purposes creates
certain benefits not allowed to heterosexual couples. For example, same-sex couples would not fall
under the anti-abuse rules for related persons. See Theodore P. Seto, The Unintended Tax
Advantages of Gay Marriage, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1529 (2008).
25. For example, under intestate laws, one inherits from his or her parents. If you are not a
legal parent, then the child does not inherit for those purposes. See Wolff, supra note 20, at 224647 (“How, then, does it make sense to argue that it is in the best interest of children to deny any
support or recognition to the relationships of their gay and lesbian parents?”).
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has been focused on resources. If that justification is proven incorrect,
the message has to change. The conclusion being that if we have
“tipped” as a country, then we should be reallocating our resources to
other more socially profitable needs.
II. PRIMER ON DIFFUSION THEORY
It is thought that social problems decline in a steady progression.26
We are used to looking back through decades of history for our
paradigms of the present. This condensation of time creates the false
assumption that social progress occurs in a linear fashion. 27 “We are all,
at heart, gradualists, our expectations set by the steady passage of
time.” 28
Sometimes, however, the decline is not slow and steady but
happens all at once. This is the phenomenon commonly known as a
tipping point. 29 This is when “the unexpected becomes expected, where
radical change is more than possibility. It is–contrary to all our
expectations–a certainty.” 30 Malcolm Gladwell did a marvelous job in
his book, The Tipping Point, of summarizing Diffusion Theory.
A.

Basics

Diffusion Theory targets how ideas or products are either accepted
or rejected. 31 “Diffusion is a special type of communication concerned

26. GLADWELL, supra note 12, at 13.
27. For example, a stock chart from 1928 to 2009 seems to show a steady linear increase in
valuation (but for the crash in 1932). The longer the time line (history), the more linear and less
volatile the movement appears.

The
previous
chart
is
available
at
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EDJI#chart3:symbol=^dji;range=19281103,20091103;chartt
ype=line;crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on.
28. GLADWELL, supra note 12, at 13.
29. See generally id.; ROGERS, supra note 3.
30. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 14.
31. Id. at 35.
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with the spread of messages that are perceived as new ideas.”32 There
are four main elements of the diffusion of new ideas: (1) an
innovation; 33 (2) that is communicated 34 through certain channels; 35 (3)
over time; 36 (4) among the members of a social system. 37 Essentially, a
new idea travels through decision trees in which members of the social
system can reject, accept, or modify the idea.38
As sociologists would argue, the key to behavior modification is to
get people to care about their neighbor in distress. 39 In Diffusion
Theory, getting people to care is a five-step process: (1) knowledge; 40
(2) persuasion; 41 (3) decision; 42 (4) implementation; 43 and (5)
So what changed in late 2009 regarding the
confirmation. 44
advancement of equal treatment for the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,

32. Id.
33. “An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or
other unit of adoption.” ROGERS, supra note 3, at 12. Innovations are not all equivalent units of
analysis. Certain characteristics as perceived by individuals, such as (1) relative advantages, e.g.,
better mouse-trap; (2) compatibility with existing values; and (3) complexity, e.g., how difficult it is
to understand, among others, are factored into the equation. Id.
34. “Communication is a process in which participants create and share information with one
another in order to reach a mutual understanding.” Id. at 5.
35. “A communication channel is the means by which messages get from one individual to
another.” Id. at 36.
36. Id. at 22.
37. “A social system is defined as a set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem
solving to accomplish a common goal.” Id. at 23. For example, the Peruvian village would be
considered a social system. See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
38. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 169.
39. See, e.g., GLADWELL, supra note 12, at 29. See also Carl Hulse, House Votes to Expand
Hate Crimes Definition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A1 (discussing the governmental response to
the national outcry for the gruesome 1998 murder of Matthew Shepard). For more on the Shepard
murder, see MATTHEW SHEPARD FOUNDATION, www.matthewshepard.org (last visited Mar. 13,
2011); Barbara Isenberg, Matthew Shepard’s Murder, 10 Years Later, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2009,
available at
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/la-ca-laramie11-2009oct11,0,2733126.story;
New
Details Emerge in Matthew Shepard Murder, ABC NEWS, (Nov. 26, 2004),
http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=277685&page=1&page=1.
40. “Knowledge occurs when an individual (or other decision-making unit) is exposed to an
innovation’s existence and gains and understanding of how it functions.” ROGERS, supra note 3, at
169.
41. “Persuasion occurs when an individual (or other decision-making unit) forms a favorable
or an unfavorable attitude towards the innovation.” Id.
42. “Decision takes place when an individual (or other decision-making unit) engages in
activities that lead to a choice to adopt or reject the innovation.” Id.
43. “Implementation occurs when an individual (or other decision-making unit) puts a new
idea into use.” Id.
44. “Implementation occurs when an individual seeks reinforcement of an innovationdecision already made, but he or she may reverse this previous decision if exposed to conflicting
messages about the innovation.” Id.
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Transgender, and Intersex (“LGBTI”) community? It is argued that
“[h]uman behavior change is often motivated in part by a state of
internal disequilibrium or dissonance, an uncomfortable state of mind
that an individual seeks to reduce or eliminate.” 45 Generally speaking,
sexual orientation discrimination is based on misrepresentation or
misunderstanding of basic human interactions. 46
B.

Communication of the Idea

Once an idea has been formulated and put through the initial
diffusion stages, it must be communicated. There have been decades of
research on the effectiveness of how ideas are communicated. 47
Communication is the method by which an idea moves through the
stages of adaptation. Oftentimes it is not the idea itself that will cause
the group to reject it, but rather, the manner in which, or the audience to
whom, the concept is presented. 48
In social science terms, it is not enough for those
misrepresentations or misunderstandings to be corrected. The mere
counter to those points will not result in empathy towards the
discriminated group. 49 People must care about the individuals in
distress. 50
The misconception that the current equal rights movement makes is
assuming that empathy is a one-way street. Empathy also runs in the
other direction. 51 The person who is acting as the change agent 52 must
empathize “with clients[, which] is especially difficult when the clients
are extremely different from the change agents.” 53 Without being
sympathetic to the individual’s beliefs, the change agent will not be

45. Id. at 189.
46. Id. at 365-70.
47. See generally GLADWELL, supra note 12; ROGERS, supra note 3; GEOFFREY MOORE,
CROSSING THE CHASM: MARKETING AND SELLING HIGHTECH PRODUCTS TO MAINSTREAM
CUSTOMERS (2002) (applying Diffusion Theory to technology companies). According to Moore,
the change agent should focus on one group of customers at a time, using each group as a base for
marketing to the next group. Id. He essentially believes that the most difficult step is making the
transition between early adopters and early majority. Id.
48. This is what is commonly referred to as an “innovation-oriented” approach versus a
“client-oriented approach.” ROGERS, supra note 3, at 5.
49. Id. at 369.
50. Id. at 20-21.
51. Id. at 376-77.
52. The change agent is the person or persons who are the communication link between the
resource system and the public. Id. at 368-73. People must accept the change agent before they will
accept the innovations that he or she is promoting. Id.
53. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 376-77.
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accepted and the message will not be heard. 54 This is especially true
when there is heterophily 55 in the message group. If the change agent
and the individuals do not speak the same language, then the
communication process breaks down. 56
One of the most used examples for the failure of an idea that was
clearly beneficial is the water boiling study done in the 1950s in Peru. 57
During that time, Peruvian villagers did not understand the relationship
between sanitation and illness. 58 Generally, the water that was
consumed was subject to pollution and contamination. 59 The boiling of
the water would alleviate waterborne diseases such as typhoid. 60 The
change agent was sent, and, over a two-year period, she visited every
home and spent a lot of time with fifteen to twenty-one families. 61 Yet
she only convinced about 5% of the population to adopt the
innovation. 62 The conclusion was that the change agent’s use of an
“innovation-oriented” rather than a “client-oriented” approach,
combined with her role as an outsider who did not fully understanding
the village norms, e.g., that hot water was only for the sick, caused the
failure. 63
C.

Change and Diffusion Theory

The underlying premise is that people do not want change. 64 If
someone has a better approach to a social norm, then she has to do two
things in order to effectuate her change. First, is to have society
empathize with her position. Second, is not only to articulate the
innovation, but also to empathize with the group she wants to adopt
her message. In the field of equality of rights for same-sex couples,
there has been a failure in the approach of the last stage of

54. Id.
55. “Heterophily . . . is defined as the degree to which two or more individuals who interact
are different in certain attributes.” Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 19, 381-83.
57. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 1-4, citing Edward Wellin, Water Boiling in a Peruvian Town,
in HEALTH, CULTURE AND COMMUNITY 71–103 (Benjamin D. Paul ed., 1955).
58. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 1-4.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Id. at 365.
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communication. Like in Peru, they have failed to empathize with the
older generation of Americans. 65
The Iowa farmer’s decision on the implementation of a new hybrid
form of corn serves as the most fundamental example on the application
of Diffusion Theory. 66 An idea proceeds through a social system within
five adopter categories. The categories of adopters are: innovators, 67
early adopters, 68 early majority, 69 late majority, 70 and laggards. 71
The study regarding the hybrid form of corn was initiated when the
Iowa state administrators wondered why the farming community was not
adopting a clearly better hybrid form of corn. Although the hybrid corn
produced more and was more resistant to disease, it was expensive
because it did not reproduce on its own. Essentially, someone had to try
it first to see if it worked at all. These farmers were the Innovators.
They would then tinker with the product to make it work better. The
first group to follow them after the trial run would be the early adopters.
The early adopters were members of the community who had more
trust and status in the community. So when they tried the hybrid corn,
their action carried more weight. If the hybrid corn proved successful
with this group, then the next step would be for the Early Majority to use
the product. Whether the idea has enough legs to get the Late Majority

65. For example, there was a recent failed ballot initiative for same-sex marriage in Maine in
2009. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Maine has 15.1% of its population over the age of
sixty-five with a median age of forty-two. This equates to Maine having the fourth oldest
population in the country. See U.S. Census Bureau Chart GCT-T4-R, Percent of the Total
Population Who Are 65, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTTable?_bm=y&-state=gct&ds_name=PEP_2008_EST&-_box_head_nbr=GCT-T4-R&-mt_name=&-redoLog=true&_caller=geoselect&-geo_id=&-format=U-40Sc&-_lang=en. Similarly, there has been discussion
concerning whether the marriage-only statutes are effectively communicating their position. In a
recent study by Doctor Egan, it was shown that the campaigning both for and against the statutes
did not change people’s opinions. See Patrick J. Egan, Findings from a Decade of Polling on Ballot
Measures Regarding the Legal Status of Same-Sex Couples, June 15, 2010, available at
http://www.haasjr.org/sites/default/files/Marriage%20Polling.pdf.
66. In fact, both ROGERS, supra note 3, and GLADWELL, supra note 12, open their books with
this example.
67. Innovators are the first individuals to adopt an innovation. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 282.
68. Early Adopters are typically younger in age, have a higher social status, have more
financial lucidity, advanced education, and are more socially forward than late adopters. Id. at 185.
69. Early Majority tend to be slower in the adoption process, have above average social status,
contact with early adopters, and show some opinion leadership. Id. at 150.
70. Late Majority are typically skeptical about an innovation, have below average social
status, very little financial lucidity, contact with others in late majority and early majority, and very
little opinion leadership. Id.
71. Laggards typically tend to be focused on “traditions,” have the lowest social status, lowest
financial fluidity, are the oldest of all other adopters, remain in contact with only family and close
friends, and have very little to no opinion leadership. Id.
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is often referred to as the “tipping point.” If it does, then it becomes a
mainstream concept. The laggards may never adopt the concept despite
its acceptance in the community.
The question becomes, from a social science point of view, whether
the message of fairness for same-sex marriage is being effectively
delivered. Is the message one that the Early and Late Majority can
accept? Is the message targeting the right audience and in an effective
manner? Up to this point, it appears it has not.
III. A CASE STUDY ON CHANGE
As amazing as it may sound, there is still one state, Florida, in
which “homosexuals” are prohibited from adopting. 72 Other states have
prohibitions against non-married couples adopting or jointly adopting. 73
However, none specifically consider sexual preferences.
As is the situation with challenges to marriage cases, the stakes are
high in the adoptive arena. There are the traditional areas of legal
obligations, support during life, and the issue of inheritance rights at
death. There is also the very real issue of what is in the best interest of
the child. Yet some states seem focused on the notion of limiting
adoptive rights without utilizing a rational approach to the underlying
assumptions and reasons for the laws. The most indicative case to deal
with same-sex couple adoption is the Florida case, In the Matter of the
Adoption of John and James Doe. 74
A.

The Florida Adoption Ban

In 1977, Anita Bryant waged her famous “Save Our Children
Campaign.” Part of this campaign was the codification of anti-gay
statutes. 75 Florida took up her cause and prohibited adoption by any

72. FLA. STAT. § 63.042(c)(3) (2008) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may
adopt if that person is a homosexual.”).
73. Other than Florida, a variety of states have prohibitions against same-sex couples’
adopting. Some states, like Arkansas, Utah or Mississippi have a total ban, while others, such as
Oklahoma and, Michigan, prohibit joint adoption. On November 4, 2008, Arkansas passed a
constitutional amendment to the state constitution that prohibited non-married individuals from
acting as an adoptive or foster parent. The ACLU is challenging the constitutionality of Act 1 in
Cole v. Arkansas, No. CV2008-14284 (Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 30, 2008), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/lgbt/cole_v_arkansas_complaintv2.pdf. Utah prohibits unmarried
persons from adopting. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-102 (West 2010). Mississippi prohibits
“[a]doption by couples of the same gender.” MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2010).
74. 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) [hereinafter Doe II].
75. The Florida statute was enacted after an organized and relentless anti-homosexual
campaign led by Anita Bryant, a pop singer who sought to repeal a January 1977 ordinance of the
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“homosexual” person. 76 The premise behind Ms. Bryant’s campaign
was that children could not be properly raised or educated by same-sex
couples. 77
As with any statute drafted in haste with animus, 78 the statute
spurred litigation. One would naturally think that the Florida courts
would have defined the term “homosexual.” 79 However, until 1993,
there were no reported cases that alleged that the term “homosexual”
was unconstitutionally vague. 80 By 1993, America was entering into the
first stage of grief: denial. 81 The old paradigm of “closeting” same-sex
couples was changing, and the country was finally faced with
confronting the old laws. DOMA was still three years away.

Dade County Metropolitan Commission that prohibited discrimination against homosexuals in the
areas of housing, public accommodations, and employment. See Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275, 1301-03 (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc). Bryant organized a drive that collected the 10,000 signatures needed to force a public
referendum on the ordinance. Id.; See also In re Adoption of John Doe, 2008 WL 5070056, at *12
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Doe I].
76. See Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056.
77. Id. at *13 (“Bryant . . . promoted the insidious myth that schoolchildren were vulnerable
to molestation at the hands of homosexual schoolteachers who would rely on the ordinance to avoid
being dismissed from their positions.”).
78. For a thorough discussion of the hateful rhetoric surrounding the passing of the statute,
see generally Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056. An example of the speech is: “The chief sponsor of two
bills to prohibit homosexuals from marrying or adopting children says that they will serve as a
warning that Florida wants homosexuals to ‘go back in the closet.’” Id. at *11. “Peterson ‘calls
homosexuality ‘a moral issue that needs to be addressed by the Legislature,’ and says ‘Biblical
teachings’ are at the base of his arguments. ‘What does regulating marriages and adoption have to
do with human rights?’’” Id. “The Florida legislature’s intention to stigmatize and demean
homosexuals is further confirmed by the passage, on May 30, 1977, of a House amendment that
allowed public disclosure of the reasons for a denial of an application for adoption.” Id. at *14.
79. Despite Florida senator N. Curtis Peterson’s, the sponsor of SB 354 (1977) that became
FLA. STAT. § 63.042(c)(3), assertion:
I have no problem with knowing what a homosexual is. I have no problem, I don’t need
to look it up in the dictionary. The average person who every day is now reading in
newspapers about the problem, turning on the television about the problem, they don’t
have to look it up in a dictionary to find out. The judge or whoever makes the decision
on adoptions will not have to look in the dictionary. They will know . . . .
Transcript of Senate Floor Debate on S.B. 354, May 11, 1977 (Sen. Peterson), at 21-22, quoted in
Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056, at *10.
80. State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d. 1210, 1213-14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
81. See ELIZABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969). Her model describes the
five stages of grief for how people deal with grief and tragedy. The five stages are: (1) denial (a
temporary defense for the individual); (2) anger (the realization that denial cannot continue coupled
with misplaced feelings of rage and envy); (3) bargaining (hope you can postpone or delay death);
(4) depression (spending time crying and grieving); and (5) acceptance (peace and understanding of
the inevitable). Id.
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Legal Challenges
1. Cox v. State

Under that spectrum, Mr. Cox challenged the Florida statute
prohibiting “homosexual” adoption on a number of grounds, but, most
importantly, on the vagueness of the term. 82 The court painstakingly
upheld the statute, which defined the term “homosexual” as “limited to
applicants who are known to engage in current, voluntary homosexual
activity.” 83 Because you can choose to be “homosexual” in the court’s
view, the state has a rational basis for claiming that homosexual parents
will not know what to say to a heterosexual teenager. 84
Yet, would the court have upheld a statute that said that only Jewish
parents could adopt Jewish children because they are in the best position
to answer religious questions? 85 The court did allow for the possibility
that new research was being conducted that would cause the legislature
to revisit the issue or allow the judiciary to override the legislature’s
reasoning. 86 In 1993, there was not enough information for the court to
rely on to change the majority view.
At that point, we were in the era of the Innovators. 87 These were
the people like the Coxes who were beginning the discussion on the
rights of same-sex couples. This discussion led to scientists and

82. Cox, 627 So. 2d. at 1214-15.
83. Id. at 1215. The court continued to try to draw distinctions between homosexual activity
and homosexual orientation. Id. There was confusion about the scientific arguments at that time.
The court tried to state the difference between the commonly accepted biological and the religious
(e.g., you can control your urges) approaches. Id. Because in 1993, the court believed this was an
issue on which you could agree to disagree, it stated that “the legislature is constitutionally
permitted to reach its own conclusions on the validity of the distinction between homosexual
orientation and activity without any mandate from this court.” Id.
84. Id. at 1220. See also Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d
1275, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (implying that
apparently, “non-practicing homosexuals” are eligible to adopt).
85. The court went out of its way to say how it is ignoring other rationales, such as “possible
injury the children might arguably sustain due to private biases or perceived prejudices against
homosexuals. We are not overlooking the pressures and stresses that peer groups might place on an
adopted child because of the adoptive parent’s homosexual activity.” Cox, 627 So. 2d. at 1220 n.10.
86. Id. at 1220. At the time of the trial, in the Appellate Court’s opinion there was very little
scientific evidence to support the conclusion that “homosexuals have normal abilities to rear
children.” Id. at 1213. The court continued that there was no expert testimony and only “law
review articles and other reports in magazines and journals.” Id. As for scientific articles, there
were only two. Id. In one article, the author discussed the need for further study, and the other
article was based on an anonymous survey of twenty-three homosexual and sixteen heterosexual
single parents. Id.
87. See GLADWELL, supra note 12, at 197.
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academics taking charge to prove or disprove the theories presented by
these Innovators.
2. Lofton v. Secretary of Department of Children and Family
Services
By 2004, the challenge offered by the Innovators had been taken
up, and a new challenge to the Florida statute had reached the Eleventh
Circuit. In Lofton, 88 the challenge offered in Cox was renewed. The
plaintiffs argued that the Florida statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause. Although the plaintiffs lost, they laid the groundwork for the
more successful actions five years later. The case also showed the shift
to the “Early Majority” with the well thought out dissenting opinion by
Judge Rosemary Barkett.
The majority opinion points out that from 1991 until 2004, only
three legislative bills 89 and three legal challenges 90 were brought against
Florida Statute Section 63.042(2). 91 Combining this information with
the court in Cox, it would appear that from 1977 until 2004 only four
cases, including the case at hand, challenged Florida Statute
Section 63.042(2). However, this is the first time that the science
requested by the Cox court was proving to be supportive of overturning
the statute. The old theory proposed at inception of the statute and
confirmed by the Cox court, that homosexuals would be lesser parents,
was being refuted.
The State of Florida realized that ignoring the primary person of
interest in an adoption, the child, was a bad idea. So the state revisited
history and took the position that the statute was enacted in order to care
for the best interests of the child. 92 Despite the legislative history and
the state’s own arguments in Cox to the contrary, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the “state’s overriding interest is not providing
individuals the opportunity to become parents, but rather identifying
those individuals whom it deems most capable of parenting adoptive
children and providing them with a secure family environment.” 93

88. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, reh’g en banc
denied, 377 F.3d 1275, 1301-03 (11th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2004).
89. S.B. 752, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); H.B. 349, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 1995); H.B. 1461, Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 1993).
90. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1210; Amer v. Johnson, 4 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 854b (Fla. Cir. Ct.
1997); Seebol v. Farie, 16 Fla. L. Weekly C52 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1991).
91. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 807.
92. Id. at 809-11.
93. Id. at 811.
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At this point in the evolution and acceptance of these rights, the
court was not prepared to overturn the statute. Unlike Cox, the plaintiffs
produced social science research supporting their opinion. 94 At the time
Lofton was decided, there was still not the unanimous agreement that is
present today, but there was finally evidence. Without cases like Cox
the research might not have been done. The research in Lofton
demonstrated “the opinion of mental health professionals and child
welfare organizations as evidence that there is no child welfare basis for
excluding homosexuals from adopting.” 95
The court then evolved the argument from Cox to state that it was
not enough that the evidence supported the decision.96 Rather, the court
stated that the “evidence [must be] so well established and so far beyond
dispute that it would be irrational for the Florida legislature to believe
that the interests of its children are best served by not permitting
homosexual adoption.” 97 The court then gave the legislature the option
to review the statute in light of the new information.98
For the first time, however, opinions on the matter were being
changed. 99 In the well thought out dissent to the rehearing en banc,
Judge Barkett pointed out the discriminatory nature of the statute.
“Florida is the only state in the union to have such a categorical statutory
prohibition targeted solely against homosexuals.” 100 It was then argued
that neither “child molesters, drug addicts, nor domestic abusers are
categorically barred by the statute from serving as adoptive parents.” 101
Finally, a court had begun the uncomfortable task of acknowledging the
wrong. 102

94. Id. at 824-26.
95. Id. at 824 (citing the Amicus Brief filed by the Child Welfare League of America,
Children’s Rights, Inc., the Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, and the National Center for
Youth Law).
96. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 825.
97. Id. at 825.
98. Id.
99. Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).
100. Id. at 1290.
101. Id.
102. The fact that Florida places children for adoption with single parents directly and
explicitly contradicts Florida’s post hoc assertion that the ban is justified by the
state’s wish to place children for adoption only with “families with married mothers
and fathers.” This contradiction alone is enough to prove that the state’s alleged
reasons are “illogical to the point of irrationality.”
However, instead of acknowledging this glaring gap between the ban on
homosexual adoption and the state’s purported justification, as did the Supreme
Court in invalidating the statutes in Eisenstadt, Moreno, Cleburne and Romer, the
Lofton panel stretches mightily to construct a hypothetical to bridge this gap.
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The curious part of this reasoning by the court is that the rational
basis stated by the legislature could really never be disputed by
evidence. 103 How can one disprove hate (e.g., “[W]e are tired of you
and wish you would go back in the closet”)? 104 The state effectively
reconfigured its justification for the statute by stating that “homosexual”
parents could not relate to heterosexual children, or that it wanted to
limit adoption to married couples. 105 So what was needed was for the
“Early Majority” to continue to tinker with the argument that was
gaining ground (e.g., the dissenting opinion) and make it more
acceptable for the “Late Majority”?
3.

The 2008 Cases

By 2008, the message and the information had changed. Within
thirty days there were two cases decided in Florida that held the Florida
Statute Section 63.042(3) unconstitutional. 106 The arguments the courts
made in striking down the statute were essentially the same that the
plaintiffs made in 1993. The difference was that the arguments had been
tweaked by the “Early Adaptors” and the “Early Majority” to make them
more acceptable to the “Late Majority.” The hostile nature of the statute
was finally addressed head on, and the lack of supporting scientific and
other evidence in Cox and Lofton was overcome.

Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1297 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451 (1972)).
103. [M]oral disapproval of disfavored groups “is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause.” Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.
Ct. 2472, 2486 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Moreno established that “if the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group
cannot constitute a legitimate government interest.” 413 U.S. at 534, 93 S. Ct. 2821.
As the Lawrence Court made clear, “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all,
not to mandate our own moral code.” 123 S. Ct. at 2480 (quoting Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)).
Nor may the state hide behind a suggestion that it is attempting to protect
children from disapproval at large in society. Florida courts have specifically
rejected moral disapprobation of homosexuality as a justification for granting
custody of a child to one or another biological parent.
Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1300.
104. Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056, at *11 (quoting State Sen. Peterson). See also Lofton, 377 F.3d
at 1303 (“In short, the legislative history shows that anti-gay animus was the major factor—indeed
the sole factor—behind the law’s promulgation . . . .”).
105. However, Florida’s adoption statute expressly provides for single persons to adopt, and
25% of adoptions out of foster care are by single persons. See Lofton, 377 F.3d at 1290-91.
106. Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 29, 2008); Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008).
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In the first Doe case, 107 the court found that Florida Statute
Section 63.042(3) was unconstitutional. 108 The court concluded that the
law not only discriminated based on sexual conduct alone and was not
concerned with the parental ability or the best interest of the child, but
that it also lacked rational basis. 109 No longer was animus alone enough
to support the statute.
In Doe I, the court provided a detailed history of the statute,
echoing the approach advocated by Judge Barkett in Lofton. With the
argument centered on the hate-based approach of 1977, the court clearly
established that there was no other reason for the statute but to put
homosexuals in their place. The court held that the “facts and
circumstances surrounding enactment of Section 63.042(3) demonstrate
that its singular purpose was to repress gay Floridians as a group,
without any consideration being given to allowing even one gay
Floridian an opportunity to establish his actual ability to parent.” 110
More importantly, the pieces that seemed to be missing in Cox and
Lofton were filled in. Even though there were more briefs and
arguments in the second Doe case, 111 substantial evidence was presented
that refuted the new state justification that it was in the best interest of
children to be raised by heterosexual parents. “In view of Dr.
Brodzinsky’s testimony that the categorical ban is irrational and
scientifically inexplicable, the Court is unable to discern any coherent
explanation for its enforcement in 2008, other than a willingness to
passively leave intact the ban against this politically-disfavored
group.” 112
Doe I was not as highly publicized as Doe II. Not only did the Doe
II decision make the national press, but it also started a dialogue within
the Florida Bar previously unseen. The case finally transitioned the
discussion to the “Late Majority.” The majority in Doe II had accepted
what was started by the “Innovator” in Cox and adapted for the public by
Lofton. The threat of appeal by the state should be of no concern for the
plaintiffs in Doe II. At this point, all the research supports the position
that this ban is not supported by a rational basis. 113
107. Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056.
108. Id. However, because neither the Department nor the Attorney General opposed the
petition, the decision would not be binding on any other court.
109. Id. at *16.
110. Id. at *24.
111. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172.
112. Doe I, 2008 WL 5070056, at *17.
113. See, e.g., Policy Statement of the National Association of Social Workers, in SOCIAL
WORK SPEAKS (6th ed. 2003) (“Legislation seeking to restrict foster care and adoption by gay,
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In Doe II, Frank Gill wanted to adopt two foster children whom he
has raised since 2004. 114 Mr. Gill was a licensed foster caregiver by the
State of Florida. 115 Despite a positive preliminary home study by the
Center for Family and Child Enrichment, his petition was denied
because Mr. Gill is a homosexual. 116
Like a Dickensian tale, on December 11, 2004, the two children,
ages four years and four months, arrived literally in rags. 117 They had
scalp ringworm and ear infections. 118 The four-year-old brother did not
speak and only cared about taking care of his younger brother. 119 As
unconscionable as it may sound, this four-year-old was apparently the
baby’s main caretaker. 120 Searching for an immediate placement so that
the brothers could have a “good Christmas,” the Social Services Agency
contacted Mr. Gill. 121
The children lived with Mr. Gill until 2006 when the parental rights
of the biological mother and biological father were terminated. 122 After
the termination of parental rights, Mr. Gill 123 petitioned for adoption of
the children. 124 From the time the children were placed into foster care
until Mr. Gill’s petition there were no prospective adoptive parents for
the children. 125
Unlike the other adoption cases, the petitioners came prepared to
present expert testimony. First, they presented Dr. David Brodzinsky,
whom the court identified as an expert in clinical and developmental

lesbian, bisexual or transgender people should be vigorously opposed.”); Ellen C. Perrin, Coparent
or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339 (2002), available at
http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/pediatrics;109/2/339.pdf (“The American Academy
of Pediatrics recognizes that a considerable body of professional literature provides evidence that
children with parents who are homosexual can have the same advantages and the same expectations
for health, adjustment, and development as can children whose parents are heterosexual.”).
114. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *1. See also Yolanne Almanzar, Florida Gay Adoption Ban
Nov.
25,
2008,
available
at
Is
Ruled
Unconstitutional,
N.Y.
TIMES,
www.nytimes.com/2008/11/26/us/26florida.html.
115. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *1.
116. Id.
117. Id. at *2 (“John the elder sibling, arrived with his four-month old brother wearing a dirty
adult sized t-shirt and sneakers four sizes too small that seemed more like flip-flops than shoes.”).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *1.
122. Id.
123. Mr. Gill was forty-five years old and unmarried at the time of the adoption application.
Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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child psychology. 126 Over a two-day period, Dr. Brodzinsky evaluated
the family. 127
In general, Dr. Brodzinsky believes that the transition into an
adoptive home is extremely difficult for children.
There is no way we can spare children from the emotional pain
associated with adoption-related loss. Children must be allowed to
experience the deep emotions associated with the loss in the context of
a warm, loving, and supportive environment. They must be allowed to
grieve the loss of birthparents; entering their family through the
process of relinquishment; etc. Their feelings cannot be trivialized or
discredited. By fully feeling the adoptee will resolve and integrate
their loss. 128

Dr. Brodzinsky sets out in his work the hardships of adjustments
that children must undergo. In his opinion, in order for a child to
become part of a functioning family unit, that child must be able to come
to the individuals in the parental role and seek comfort and advice so the
child can work through the feelings of loss associated with family
transformation. 129 Simply stated, the adoptive child has to be able to
generate trust in the adoptive parents.
Dr. Brodzinsky in his testimony concluded that,
For James Doe, it’s the only home he’s ever known. Not only are
these his parents in every sense of the word . . ., he’s very emotionally
bonded, connected, attached to them. Disruptive attachments raise the
risk, significantly, for all sorts of long-term problems.
For John Doe, he’s a child who came into the family with a risky
history already, previous disrupt[ed] placements. To remove him at
this time, when he has stability in his life, residential stability and

126. Id. at *3. Dr. Brodzinsky is widely recognized as one of the leading psychologists on the
issue of adoption, foster care, and same-sex couple adoption. He has over thirty years of experience
in the field. Among other positions, he served for over thirty-two years, until his retirement, as
Professor Emeritus of Developmental and Clinical Psychology at Rutgers University. He has
testified in a number of nationally prominent cases, including the Baby M contested adoption case
in New Jersey, the Baby Jessica contested adoption case in Michigan, the Woody Allen & Mia
Farrow contested adoption and custody case in New York, and the gay marriage trial in Hawaii. He
is the co-author or co-editor of five influential books on adoption, including BEING ADOPTED: THE
LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1992); CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT TO ADOPTION: DEVELOPMENTAL
AND CLINICAL ISSUES (1998); and PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN ADOPTION: RESEARCH AND
PRACTICE (2005).
127. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *3.
128. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 126 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schecter
eds., 1993).
129. Id.
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emotional stability, would be devastating to him. In my opinion, it
would cause long-term damage. 130

He testified that a second separation for John and a first for James
would cause, among other things, academic regression, separation
anxiety, and sleeping problems. 131 Further, and most importantly, based
on Dr. Brodzinsky’s hypothesis, this would cause trust issues. 132
Dr. Brodzinsky then concluded that Mr. Gill and his partner had a
high quality of parenting, the parent-child relationships were strong and
healthy, and the children were given the necessary resources to lead a
healthy, happy life. 133 Most importantly, there would be severe trauma
to the children if they were separated from Mr. Gill. 134 The sexual
orientation of Mr. Gill was not a factor in his parenting abilities. 135
The divergence of this case from the others happened with the
proffering of six experts, in addition to Dr. Brodzinsky. 136 The state

130. Transcript of Record at 773-74, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172.
131. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *4.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Dr. Michael Lamb is a developmental psychologist with over thirty years of experience
currently serving as the head of the department of psychology and head of the faculty of social
sciences at Cambridge. Transcript of Record at 451-67, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172. Even the
state’s expert recognized Dr. Lamb as a reputable researcher. Transcript of Record at 1241-42, Doe
II, 2008 WL 5006172. He is an expert on the psychology and development of children, including
those raised by gay parents. Transcript of Record at 467, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172. He testified
that sexual orientation did not predict healthy child adjustment. Dr. Frederick Berlin is a
psychiatrist with over thirty years of experience, focused on human sexuality. He is an associate
professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. Transcript of Record at 636-49, Doe II,
2008 WL 5006172. Dr. Berlin testified as to human sexuality, including homosexuality, pedophilia,
and child sex abuse. Transcript of Record at 649, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172. Dr. Berlin testified
that homosexuality is not considered a mental disorder within the field of psychiatry, and there was
no influence on a child’s sexuality based on a parent’s sexual orientation. Dr. Susan Cochran, a
psychologist and epidemiologist at UCLA’s Department of Public Health, has conducted many of
the leading studies that examine the rate of health problems (including mental health problems)
among gay people compared to heterosexuals. Transcript of Record at 128-39, Doe II, 2008 WL
5006172. The state experts cited to her research in their testimony. Transcript of Record at 857-66,
870, 877-79, 1197, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172. She found that there was no health disparity. Dr.
Margaret Fischl is a professor of medicine at the University of Miami School of Medicine
specializing in AIDS and HIV research. Transcript of Record at 332-44, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172.
She testified that the risk of household transmission of HIV was low to nonexistent. Doe II, 2008
WL 5006172, at *13. Dr. Letitia Anne Peplau is a professor of psychology at UCLA with over
thirty-five years experience. She testified as to couple relationships, including violence in
relationships and same-sex couples’ relationships. Transcript of Record at 26–27, Doe II, 2008 WL
5006172. Patricia Lager has been a professor of social work at Florida State University for over
twenty years and has authored two textbooks on child welfare practice. Transcript of Record at
266-73, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172. She is an expert on child welfare policy and practice, adoption
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offered two experts, only one of which was qualified. 137 Unlike past
cases, where the court could have perceived a split of authority, here the
message was clearly altered to reflect the change in the academic
research and theory. There was no more clear distinction as to the
quality and persuasiveness of the experts.
The state’s position in defense of the statute was that “homosexual
adoption restriction serves the legitimate state interest of promoting the
well-being of minor children, as well as broader, societal morality
interests.” 138 In support of its position, the state offered the testimony of
its two experts. With similar arguments and similarly unsubstantiated
facts, the state’s experts testified that it was not in the best interest of the
children to be with homosexual individuals because it results in “(1) a
lifetime prevalence of significantly increased psychiatric disorders; (2)
higher levels of alcohol and substance abuse; (3) higher levels of major
depression; (4) higher levels of affective disorder; (5) four times higher
levels of suicide attempts; and (6) substantially increased rates of
relationship instability and breakup.” 139
Given the historical underpinnings of the statute and the state’s
argument, only a well-argued, point-by-point demonstration of fallacious
reasoning for the statute would suffice. The court systematically broke
down the expert testimony into four categories: (1) psychological; 140 (2)
medical; 141 (3) sexual disorders; 142 and (4) child welfare and policy. 143
In each category, through the use of esteemed experts, the petitioner and
then the court established the flawed reasoning that supported the
statute. As shameful as the exercise sounds, it was necessary to refute
the state’s reasoning.
As Dr. Peplau testified, “the research in the field suggests that the
relationships of lesbians and gay men are similar in stability, quality,

best practices, and the Florida child welfare system. Transcript of Record at 272-74, Doe II, 2008
WL 5006172. She testified that individualized evaluations, not blanket exclusions, undermine the
interest of children by depriving them of permanency. Id.
137. The state offered Dr. George Rekers, a developmental and clinical psychologist, who
retired from the University of South Carolina Medical School. Transcript of Record at 810-25, Doe
II, 2008 WL 5006172. Dr. Walter Schumm, a professor of Family Studies at Kansas State
University, was not accepted as an expert by the court because (1) he lacked qualifications to testify
about most of the subjects he addressed at trial, and (2) his testimony was not credible. Transcript
of Record at 1057-83, Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172.
138. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *6.
139. Id.
140. Id. at *5-6.
141. Id. at *12-13.
142. Id. at *13.
143. Id. at *14.
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satisfaction, shared experiences and conflict resolution, to that of
heterosexual married and unmarried couples.” 144 More importantly, the
research supports the conclusion that sexual orientation is no more of a
significant predictor of breakup than age, income, religion, education,
and race. 145 So the premise that this is an unstable home environment
does not appear to be supported by any of the current science.
Moreover, the inverse may be true. “[H]omosexually behaving
individuals tend to be more highly educated and high income earners
[and] sexual orientation is less correlated to break-up rates than race or
income, for example.” 146 As the American Psychological Association
concluded in 2004,
Same sex couples: (1) want to have primary and committed
relationships and are successful in doing so; (2) are no more
dysfunctional or less satisfying than heterosexual relationships; (3) are
able to form committed, stable enduring relationships; and (4) are
affected by the same internal and external processes as heterosexual
couples. 147

Dr. Cochran then testified to the effects of sexual orientation on
mental health and the prevalence of psychiatric disorders.148 Using a
statistical analysis of social science research, Dr. Cochran concluded that
although the average rates of psychiatric conditions, substance abuse,
and smoking are slightly higher for homosexuals than heterosexuals,
those statistical differences are insignificant.149 “[M]embers of every
demographic group suffer from these conditions at rates not significantly
higher than for homosexuals.” 150 Taken to the extreme, Dr. Cochran
pointed out that the only group eligible to adopt under the state’s
rationale—lower rates of psychiatric disorders, substance abuse, and
smoking than heterosexuals—would be Asian-American men. 151
The court summarily dismissed the argument as to life expectancy
because there have been no studies about life expectancies due to the
lack of reporting of sexual orientation on death certificates. 152
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at *6.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *7 (citing AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION OF SEXUAL
ORIENTATION,
PARENTS
AND
CHILDREN
(2004),
available
at
http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/parents.html).
148. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *7.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *8.
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Moreover, the various demographic characteristics make any broadbased conclusions invalid. 153 Sexual orientation does not alone stand as
a predictor of life expectancy. 154
Dr. Lamb then testified “with certainty that children raised by
homosexual parents do not suffer an increased risk of behavioral
problems, psychological problems, academic development, gender
identity, sexual identity, maladjustment, or interpersonal relationship
development.” 155
He set the three important factors for healthy adjustment of
children. 156 The predictors are: (1) relationship with the child’s parents;
(2) the relationship between the adults in the child’s life; and (3)
resources available to the child. 157 Dr. Lamb testified that the initial
belief was that traditional families provided the best environment for
children. 158 However, as the research developed, that notion proved to
be flawed and the quality of the parenting was proven empirically to be
the important factor. 159
Further, Dr. Lamb testified that children raised by gay parents
develop social relationships the same as those raised by heterosexual
parents. 160 Sexual orientation is not a single predictor for bullying.
“The research shows that children of gay parents are not ostracized and
do not experience discrimination any more than children of heterosexual
parents.” 161
Finally, Dr. Lamb concluded by stating that there is no optimal
gender combination of parents. 162 Men are no better than women. 163
Moreover, the “well established and generally accepted consensus in the
field [is] that children do not need a parent of each gender to adjust
healthily.” 164
The only testimony to counter the petitioner’s arguments that the
state’s position was based on either outdated or incorrect scientific

153. Id. For example, women live five years longer than men. Within the class of women and
within the class of white women, educated white women live five years longer than uneducated
white women. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court cited supporting studies for Dr. Lamb’s conclusions. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at *9.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *10.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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theory was offered by Dr. Rekers. 165 The court was skeptical of Dr.
Rekers’ motivations. 166 Regardless, Dr. Rekers testified that he believed
individuals had “two to four times the odds of having lifetime
prevalence of major depression and affective disorders in general.” 167
Despite all evidence to the contrary, 168 Dr. Rekers suggested that
since homosexual couples breakup more, children in these homes suffer
more. 169 The court pointed out that his conclusions were based on both
distorted and misrepresented information or from authors who are
neither psychotherapists nor social scientists. 170 “Dr. Rekers astounded
the Court when he testified that he favors removal of any child from a
homosexual household, even after placement in that household for ten
years, in favor of a heterosexual household.” 171
The court summarily dismissed the other state’s expert witness, Dr.
Schumm, because he was not a psychologist and his re-analysis was not
published in respected peer review journals. 172 His lack of credentials,
combined with his disagreement with Dr. Rekers’ testimony, created
doubt as to his veracity as a witness by the court. “Dr. Schumm
admitted that he applies statistical standards that depart from
conventions in the field.” 173
The court then moved on to the medical testimony. Dr. Fischl
testified that the majority of HIV cases are transmitted by
heterosexuals. 174 Despite the popular belief to the contrary, Dr. Fischl
“affirms that HIV is clearly not only a gay disease.”175 Further, because
the transmission of HIV is via blood or sexual transmission, the risk of
“household transmission is low to nonexistent.” 176

165. Id.
166. Id. The court cited that he is an ordained Baptist minister and the state has paid him for
his services in advance. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *11 (“The Court finds this testimony to be contrary to science and decades of
research in child development.”). See also id. at *12 (“Dr. Rekers’ beliefs are motivated by his
strong ideological and theological convictions that are not consistent with the science.”).
169. Id. at *11.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at *12.
173. Id.
174. Id. at *13.
175. Id. Center for Disease Control Statistics show that 50% of HIV infections occur among
homosexual men, 35% among heterosexual men and women, and the remainder among intravenous
drug users. Id.
176. Id.
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The court then reviewed the testimony of the experts on the third
issue of sexual disorders. 177 Dr. Berlin testified that homosexuality was
removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric
Disorders in 1973 because it was not a disorder. 178 Moreover, he
testified that sexual orientation is “not affected by one’s
environment.” 179
Dr. Berlin continued to dispel myths surrounding homosexuality by
explaining that adult males attracted to male children is not
homosexuality but rather pedophilia. 180 He had to reiterate that
pedophilia and homosexuality are not analogous. 181 “[G]ay people are
no more likely to abuse children, or be sexually attracted to children than
heterosexual people.” 182
The final and most important issue in the case had to do with what
was in the best interest of the child. 183 Professor Lager testified that
there is not one kind of family best for all children. 184 Actually, “there is
a consensus in the child welfare field that any such categorical exclusion
is not in the best interest of children . . . .” 185
The evidence clearly established that there is no scientific reason
for a blanket prohibition against homosexual adoption. First, the court
established that Florida statutes require that all dependent children have
a stable and permanent home. 186 Adoption is the preferred form of
permanency as adoption serves the best interest of the children. 187 So
the first conclusion the court made was that the statute “violates the
Children’s rights by burdening liberty interests by unduly restraining
them in State custody . . . and . . . deny[ing] them a permanent adoptive
placement that is in their best interests . . . .” 188
The court opined that the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause. 189 The court revisited the 1993 Cox decision, 190 where the court

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *14.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. (“[T]he Child Welfare League of America and the National Association of Social
Workers published position statements that homosexually behaving individuals should not be
treated any differently than heterosexuals in terms of their ability to adopt.”).
186. Id. at *21.
187. Id. at *23 (citing G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978 (Fla. 2008)).
188. Id., at *25.
189. Id.
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denied the application of the Equal Protection Clause. However, the
court pointed out that in Cox, only “law review articles, reports,
editorials and discussions appearing in magazines and journals” 191 were
relied on by the court. The court then discussed Lofton, which called for
more evidence. 192
The evidence presented clearly demonstrated that, based on the
developments in the fields of social science, psychology, human
sexuality, social work and medicine, the existence of additional studies,
the re-analysis and peer review of prior studies, the endorsements by the
major psychological, psychiatry, child welfare and social work
associations, and the now, consensus based on widely accepted results of
respected studies by qualified experts, the presumptions from Cox and
Lofton have been overcome. 193
The matter did not involve a fundamental right or suspect class, so
the rational basis test was applied. 194 Under the rational basis test, the
court concluded that the state’s interest in providing a stable permanent
home environment is not served by this blanket prohibition. Not one of
the state’s arguments: (i) promoting the well being of the children; 195
(ii) the social stigmatization of the children; 196 or (iii) morality, 197 met
the rational basis test.
The Miami-Dade County Court, affirmed by the Third District
Court of Appeals, 198 articulated how the statute failed the rational basis
test. The court was able to reach that conclusion through basic Diffusion
Theory. The idea was presented in Cox. The communication listened to
190. State v. Cox, 627 So. 2d. 1210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
191. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *26.
192. Id.
193. Id. at *27.
194. Id.
195. Id. at *28 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)) (“[T]o be
considered rationally related to a governmental interest, the distinctions between individuals may
not be based on unsubstantiated assumptions.”); Id. at *28 (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. 528)
(“[H]ere, the evidence proves quite the contrary; homosexuals are no more susceptible to mental
health or psychological disorders, substance or alcohol abuse or relationship instability than their
heterosexual counterparts.”).
196. Id. (“[T]here is no optimal gender combination of parents.”).
197. Id. at *29 (“[P]ublic morality per se, disconnected from any separate legitimate interest, is
not a legitimate government interest to justify unequal treatment”). The Department’s opinion that
homosexuality alone is immoral is unable to be reconciled with the permission of homosexual foster
parenting (“There is no ‘morality’ interest with regard to one group of individuals permitted to form
the visage of a family in one context but prohibited in another”). Id.
198. In September 2010, the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida upheld the Miami-Dade
County Court. Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families v. In re Matter of Adoption of X.X.G. and
N.R.G., No. 3D08-3044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.3dca.flcourts.org/opinions/3D08-3044.pdf.
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the other side and conducted additional research. Then the idea “tipped”
as we moved to the Late Majority.
IV. ATTACK ON THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT
DOMA is constantly coming under attack through legal challenges.
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley announced in early
July 2009 that the Commonwealth filed a lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of DOMA, 199 and the plaintiffs in Gill v. Office of
Personnel Management amended their complaint, targeting the denial of
certain federal rights and protections to married same-sex couples in
Massachusetts.
In early August 2009, in the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Section of Family
Law and the Bar Associations of Beverly Hills, Massachusetts and San
Francisco Report to the House of Delegates, they urge Congress to
repeal the DOMA. Moreover, around the same time, the Third District
Court of Appeals in Florida heard arguments for the appeal of the circuit
court’s decision in 2008 that ruled that Florida’s ban on adoption by
“homosexuals” 200 was unconstitutional.
In the span of six months DOMA faced its most formidable
challenges. From the legal scholars to the states to the legislative branch
to the current administration, DOMA was under legal, moral, and
philosophical attack. Supporters of the Act could no longer rely on the
statistics and public opinion polls to ensure the viability of the Act. But,
to overcome the Act, opponents of the Act still need to effectively
communicate their position.
A.

Historical Background of DOMA

Prior to the adoption of the DOMA in 1996, the federal government
of the United States recognized that the authority to create and regulate
marital status was the exclusive prerogative of the states. 201 The federal

199. The suit states that, “In enacting DOMA, Congress overstepped its authority, undermined
states’ efforts to recognize marriages between same-sex couples, and codified an animus towards
gay and lesbian people.” Complaint, Introduction, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT), 2009 WL 1995808
[hereinafter Complaint].
200. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2008) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute
may adopt if that person is homosexual.”).
201. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (citing In re
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)) (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”);
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government consistently deferred to the states’ definitions of marriage,
for eligibility of a right, responsibility, or protection under the law. 202
The general rule gives way when states’ marriage laws fail to conform to
constitutional guarantees. 203
States have been addressing what protections should be available to
same-sex couples since at least 1971. In Baker v. Nelson, the first
challenge by a same-sex couple to the marriage act was decided in
Minnesota. 204 After the filing of Baker, there were a number of
challenges across the country. 205 All were unsuccessful.
For almost 200 years, states have adjudicated their differences
regarding their marriage laws. There have been significant policy
differences between states in the arena of civil marriage laws.206 A large
body of case law exists that demonstrates the ability of states to decide
whether to give effect to out of state marriages regarding “racially mixed

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
regulation of “marriage, divorce, and child custody” is an example of lawmaking powers beyond the
constitutional authority of the federal government); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878)
(noting that the state has the “absolute right to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage
relation between its own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be dissolved”).
See also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (“The scope of a federal right is, of
course, a federal question, but that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by state,
rather than federal law. This is especially true where a statute deals with a familial relationship;
there is no federal law of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.” (Internal
citations omitted)). For example, states can decide marriage age and familial relationships.
202. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 21. For example, in applying the 198 marriage provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, state or tribal recognition is the determining factor.
See Rev. Rul. 83-183, 1983-2 C.B. 220 (“Tax payers who meet the requirements in their state of
residence for a valid marriage may file a joint return even though they have never been legally
declared married by a court of law.”). Id. (citing Ross v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 488 (1972),
and Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60); Eccles v. Comm’r, 19 T.C. 1049, 1051 (1953), aff’d per
curiam, 208 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1953) (holding that for federal income tax purposes, the
determination of marital status must be made in accordance with the law of the State of the marital
domicile); Robert Calhoun, Jr. v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M (CCH) 2875 (1992) (citing Eccles, supra, and
Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)) (noting that domestic relations is an “area that has long
been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States”). Cf. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2009). See also Cain, supra note 20 (discussing the constitutionality
of DOMA as applied to the Internal Revenue Code).
203. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (striking state marriage restriction based on
incarceration); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (striking state marriage restriction based
on poverty); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking state law marriage restrictions
based on race); Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (striking down the anti-miscegenation law
on state constitutional grounds).
204. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
205. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d
952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), review
den’d, 84 Wash. 2d 1008 (1974).
206. See Wolff, supra note 20.
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marriages, consanguineous or incestuous relationships, marriages
involving minors, and other contentious relationship categories, . . .” 207
In 1993, the pressing issue of same-sex marriage rose to national
stature. 208 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in a plurality opinion,
narrowly ruled in Baehr v. Lewin 209 that refusing to grant marriage
licenses to same-sex couples was sex-based discrimination. 210 The
Court did not order the state to begin the issuance of marriage licenses
but, rather, remanded the case to the circuit court to decide if the state
had a compelling interest in maintaining its marriage laws.211 Upon
remand, the circuit court found no compelling state interest. 212 As a
result of the circuit court’s holding on remand, no state recognized samesex marriage at the time of the passing of DOMA. But the Hawaii
courts’ decisions raised the national issue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. 213 Essentially, the argument was that when Hawaii validates
same-sex marriage, other states would then have to recognize those
marriages. 214
The decision in Hawaii caused a predictable backlash. Thirtyseven states, 215 including, ironically, Hawaii, 216 enacted legislation to
define marriage as a union between a man and a woman. Acting under
the second sentence of the Clause, commonly referred to as the Effects
Clause, Congress enacted DOMA in 1996 to preempt the argument that

207. Id. at 2216.
208. William C. Duncan, Speaking Up for Marriage, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 915, 916
(2009).
209. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
210. Id. at 68.
211. Id. Duncan, supra note 208, at 916.
212. Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996), aff’d 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw.
1997).
213. Duncan, supra note 208, at 916-17. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255
(1998).
214. The first sentence of the Clause mandated the result. Duncan, supra note 208, at 917;
Whitten, supra note 213, at 255.
215. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2005) (“Marriage, recognition thereof, between persons
of the same sex prohibited.”); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25 (“To be valid or recognized in this State,
a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman.”); ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (2002);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(C) (2000) (“Marriage between persons of the same sex is void and
prohibited.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-112(A) (2000) (“Marriages valid by the laws of the
place where contracted are valid in this state, except marriages that are void and prohibited by § 25101.”).
216. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (“The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples.”).
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states would have to recognize same-sex unions from other states.217
“Overwhelming margins in both the House (342 to 67) and the Senate
(84 to 14) approved the [Defense of Marriage] Act,” 218 which was
signed into law on September 21, 1996. 219
DOMA provides two main concepts. First, it defines marriage, for
federal purposes, as a union between a man and a woman. This
provision prospectively invalidated marriages of same-sex couples for
purposes of federal laws, regardless of whether those laws were enacted
prior to or subsequent to DOMA. More specifically, it provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife. 220

The second purpose of DOMA was to provide that Congress has
the authority to give parameters to the Full Faith and Credit Clause by
permitting states to not recognize same-sex marriages valid in other
states. Specifically:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State, territory or possession, or tribe
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such
relationship. 221

217. This is arguably the same power that they had prior to enacting DOMA. See Duncan,
supra note 208, at 917; Whitten, supra note 213, at 255.
218. Duncan, supra note 208, at 917.
219. Although it may be convenient to think that such an overwhelming majority of Congress
voted for the Act due to the election that year, which may be true, it should be noted that not all
politicians running for reelection in 1996 voted for the Act. Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts
voted against the Act, even though he was the only Senator running for reelection in 1996 who did.
“In 1996, I voted against the so-called Defense of Marriage Act not just because I believed it was
nothing more than a fundamentally political ploy to divide Americans, but because it was
unconstitutional.” Press Release from Sen. John F. Kerry, Kerry Supports A.G. Coakley’s Lawsuit
Filed
Today
Challenging
DOMA
(July
8,
2009),
available
at
http://kerry.senate.gov/press/release/?id=c2ea21e6-4e00-4726-9925-90fe9c24ff4c.
220. Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010).
221. Id. § 2. Congress relied on its “express grant of authority” under the second sentence of
the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause “to prescribe the effect that public acts, records, and
proceedings from one State shall have in sister States.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 25 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930.
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The enactment of DOMA did not eliminate the question of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause on same-sex marriage. 222 It created additional
questions about the constitutional validity of the Act. Several members
of Congress, as well as most commentators, expressed doubts about the
constitutionality of the Act for a litany of reasons, 223 including the
failure of Congress to define marriage, and that, traditionally, the Full
Faith and Credit Clause has been used to require enforcement of a
mandate, not restrict one. 224
Further, the passage of “DOMA . . . eviscerat[ed] more than 200
years of federal government deference to the states with respect to
defining marriage.” 225 The determination of what constitutes marriage
has traditionally been a power reserved by the states. Contrary to the
long history of federalism in this area, the federal government decided
that it was necessary to defend the “institution of traditional heterosexual
marriage.” 226
In addition to the question of constitutionality based on the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, there was a second question of constitutionality
based on the lack of a congressional definition of marriage. 227 The
passing of DOMA prevents states from recognizing same-sex marriage.
Even if Massachusetts were to have a law allowing same-sex marriage,
the federal government would not recognize this marriage. As argued by
the attorney general of Massachusetts, “DOMA was enacted to deny
federal rights and protections to same-sex couples who are validly
married under state law.” 228 Traditional federal benefits, which

222. Whitten, supra note 213, at 256.
223. See, e.g., Press Release from Sen. John F. Kerry, supra note 219. Cf. Whitten, supra note
213, at 391-92 (“The historical evidence examined above makes it clear that the first sentence of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be interpreted to contain broad choice of law commands to
the states. Likewise, the evidence is compelling that Congress was intended to have broad power to
create statutes like DOMA under the Effects Clause. Therefore, DOMA may be superfluous, or
even unwise, but the history of the clause indicates that it should not be held unconstitutional.”).
224. See, e.g., Press Release from Sen. John F. Kerry, supra note 219 (“But it seems to me that
what Congress is doing is allowing a State to ignore another State’s acts, and every law that
Congress has ever passed has invoked the full faith and credit of another State’s legislation. All of
these laws share a basic common denominator. They all implement the full faith and credit
mandate. They do not restrict it. Not once has it been restricted in that way. For example, the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1990 provided the States have to enforce child custody
determinations made by other States . . . . It did not say you could not do it. It did not say you could
avoid it. It did not diminish it. It said you have to enforce it.”).
225. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 23.
226. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2, 9.
227. 142 CONG. REC. H7446 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (stating that DOMA “defines marriage
in Federal Law”); Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 27.
228. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 30 (citing H.R. REP NO. 104-664, at 18).
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normally would be available to same-sex married couples under
applicable state law, would no longer qualify. 229
B.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services

On July 8, 2009, Attorney General Martha Coakley of
Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in United States District Court challenging
Section 3 of DOMA. 230 The lawsuit alleges that more than 16,000
married same-sex couples in Massachusetts are denied important federal
rights based on marital status. 231 However, this is not a challenge by any
of those couples, but, rather, an action by the state itself.
The Commonwealth instituted the lawsuit to protect its sovereign
interest by not desiring to implement federal policies that conflict with
Massachusetts’s law. 232 The United States is a defendant of the action.
Essentially, the case is Massachusetts v. United States over the age-old
question of federalism.
The complaint attacks DOMA with a multi-faceted approach. The
complaint alleges: (1) that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment by
violating the state’s right to regulate and define marriage for its
citizens; 233 and (2) that DOMA violates Article I, § 8 of the United
States Constitution, commonly referred to as the Spending Clause. 234
229. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 31.
230. Id. ¶ 1.
231. Id. at Introduction.
232. Id. at Introduction, ¶¶ 2, 3, 27, 28, 80-86.
233. Id. ¶¶ 80-86; Brief for Attorney General, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint and in Support of Commonwealth’s Motion for
Summary Judgment at 15, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT), 2010 WL 1285463 (“The Tenth Amendment . . .
operates to confine Congress to its constitutionality-conferred powers.”) Since “domestic relations
are the paradigmatic area of State . . . concern,” then that definition belongs to the State. Id. at 16.
Thus, the attorney general argues that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment by interfering with the
power to issue marriage licenses that qualify individuals as married for state and federal purposes.
Id. at 15-22. DOMA should not be limited to federal funding programs. Id. at 20-21. But see
Department of Justice Brief, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234
(D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT), 2009 WL 3794375. The Department of Justice argues
that DOMA does not violate the Tenth Amendment because it “does not present an ‘unavoidable
command’ to state governments ‘to implement legislation enacted by Congress.’” Id. at 11-12
(citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176, 185 (1992)). The argument is that states
have a choice: “to use federal matching funds or grants for the purposes Congress has specified in
authorizing such grants or to forgo those funds.” Id. at 12. Further, Congress has the power to
influence a State’s policy choices. Id. (citing Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203-04
(10th Cir. 2000)) (rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to conditions on the receipt of certain
block grants that require States to pass particular legislation; holding that in the context of a
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According to the complaint, at the time of the enactment of DOMA,
In 2004,
no states officially recognized same-sex marriage. 235
Massachusetts became the first state to recognize same-sex marriage. 236
In Massachusetts, since inception of the marriage statute, over 16,000
same-sex couples have married. 237
Attorney General Coakley argues that DOMA causes two harms to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. First, it interferes with the
Commonwealth’s regulation of the marital status of its citizens. 238
DOMA essentially creates two classes of married persons within the
state because it denies rights and protections to married same-sex
couples. 239 Second, DOMA imposes improper conditions on the
Commonwealth’s participation in certain federally funded programs. 240
DOMA requires the Commonwealth to treat married individuals in
same-sex relationships as single, imposing improper conditions. 241
In the complaint, the attorney general examines the historical
context of DOMA. 242 She begins by attempting to lay the groundwork
that the statute was adamantly flawed from the outset. She quotes
numerous congressmen who, during discussion of the law, recognize
that DOMA is imposing on the states’ absolute sovereignty to define
marriage. 243 However, in the attorney general’s opinion, DOMA was
voluntary federal-state program, a State “is ultimately free to reject both the conditions and the
funding no matter how hard that choice may be”); Nat’l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d
38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting Massachusetts Burma Law, despite contentions that court decision
interfered with purchasing decisions at the core of state sovereignty; noting “even if Massachusetts
were being compelled to deal with firms that do business in Burma, such compulsion is not similar
to the federal government compulsion of States found impermissible in New York and Printz”);
Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting claim that federal Medicaid
requirement to provide emergency medical care to illegal aliens is example of federal
“commandeering,” and noting voluntary nature of State participation of the program); Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
234. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶¶ 87-98.
235. Id. ¶ 22.
236. Id. ¶¶ 13-20 (citing Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003), and
MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 11-12 (2010)).
237. Complaint, supra note 199, at Introduction.
238. Id. ¶ 33.
239. Id. ¶ 26.
240. Id. ¶¶ 46-79.
241. Id. ¶ 45.
242. Id. ¶¶ 21-31.
243. Id. ¶¶ 27-28 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H7446 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)) (“[DOMA]
defines marriage in Federal law for the first time and says to any State, ‘No matter what you do,
whether you do it by referendum or by public decision or by legislative action, the Federal
Government won’t recognize a marriage contracted in your state if we don’t like the definition. We
are going to trample the States’ rights’ . . . .’” (statement of Rep. Jerrold Nadler)); id. (quoting 142
CONG. REC. at H7749 (daily ed. July 11, 1996)) (“[DOMA] is an unnecessary intrusion into the
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“enacted to codify animus against gay and lesbian people.” 244 This
argument is similar to the approach taken in Doe II, where the record
behind the legislation was utilized to debunk the purpose of the
legislation.
The codification of prejudice in DOMA results in the denial of
federal rights and protections to same-sex couples who are married
under state law. 245 This distinction is the crux of the attorney general’s
argument. She argues that if you are validly married in Massachusetts,
then you should be considered validly married for the purpose of
obtaining federal benefits for married spouses. 246 Further, because of
DOMA, Massachusetts becomes an agent in the implementation of the
discriminatory federal plan. 247

State domain of family law. It tears at the fabric of our Constitution. Historically, States have the
primary authority to regulate marriage based upon the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution . . . . If
there is any area of law to which States can lay a claim to exclusive authority, it is the field of
family relations.” (statement of Rep. Neil Abercrombie)); id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S10120
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996)) (“[I]t is not clear that this is even an appropriate area for Federal
legislation. Historically, family law matters, including marriage, divorce, and child custody laws,
have always been within the jurisdiction of State governments, not the Federal Government.”
(statement of Sen. Russell Feingold)).
244. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 29 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 15-16 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2919-2920; 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (daily ed. July 11,
1996)) (“[N]o society that has lived through the transition to homosexuality and the perversion
which it lives and what it brought forth.” (statement of Rep. Tom Coburn)); id. (quoting 142 CONG.
REC. H7482 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)) (“The very foundations of our society are in danger of being
burned. The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames of self-centered morality are
licking at the very foundations of our society. . . .” (statement of Rep. Bob Barr)); id (quoting 142
CONG. REC. S10068 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996)) (DOMA “will safeguard the sacred institutions of
marriage and the family from those who seek to destroy them and who are willing to tear apart
America’s moral fabric in the process.” (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms)); see also Brief for
Attorney General, Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Complaint and in Support of Commonwealth’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Massachusetts
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156JLT), 2010 WL 581804 (“Members of Congress repeatedly condemned homosexuality in the floor
debates surrounding DOMA’s passage, calling it ‘immoral,’ ‘based on perversion,’ 142 CONG. REC.
H7444 (daily ed. July 11, 1996) (statement of Rep. Coburn), ‘unnatural,’ id. at H7494 (daily ed.
July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith), ‘depraved,’ and ‘an attack upon God’s principles,’ id. at
H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer)). See also Cain, supra note 20, at 48890.
245. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 34. There are 1,138 statutory provisions for which marital
status is a factor for determining entitlements. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004).
246. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶¶ 30, 33. The attorney general uses the example that
survivor benefits for veterans of the Armed Services would be available to same-sex marriages in
Massachusetts but for the enactment of DOMA. Id. ¶ 30.
247. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 45. (“In making that choice, the Commonwealth is faced
with an unconstitutional dilemma: maintain federal funding by disregarding marriages that are valid
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Specifically, the attorney general argues, regarding MassHealth,
that there are two classes of individuals. 248 MassHealth receives federal
funding; therefore, MassHealth must disregard validly married same-sex
couples in Massachusetts. 249 Because assets of married couples are
counted jointly in calculating the qualifying assets, DOMA forces
Massachusetts to treat married individuals differently depending on if
they are married to a person of the same-sex. 250
The attorney general argues that Massachusetts is presented with an
unattainable choice—violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by applying DOMA’s definition of marriage in
order to receive federal funds, or risk the loss of federal funding for noncompliance with Medicaid and Medicare rules.251 Given this choice, the
logical choice would be to accept the government funding. This action
results in discriminatory enforcement by the Commonwealth. 252
However, Massachusetts merely argues in its pleadings that its choice is
either follow the federal rules or lose funding. 253 Is not the stronger
argument that they will not honor any federal programs in
Massachusetts, because these programs do not equally protect all
Massachusetts citizens?
Continuing with this line of reasoning, the rationale for the denial
of these benefits at the time of the enactment of DOMA was purportedly
for the preservation of federal resources. 254 It was argued at the time
that the inclusion of a new class of individuals entitled to benefits would
render the system incapable of to sustaining its current level of
service. 255 A follow-up study done by the Congressional Budget Office
in 2004 determined that the recognition of same-sex couples’ marriages
would actually save the federal budget between $500 million and $900
million annually. 256

under state law and discriminating against same-sex couples or risk losing federal funding by
honoring marriages valid under state law and treating married couples equally.”).
248. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 51.
249. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶¶ 51, 54, 57, 59-62.
250. Id.
251. See generally Complaint, supra note 199.
252. See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 12, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT.
253. Id.
254. Complaint, supra note 199, ¶ 31.
255. Id.
256. Id. (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF
RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGES (2004), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/0621-samesexmarriage.pdf).
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Gill v. Office of Personnel Management

Gill has been designated as the most compelling challenge to
Section 3 of DOMA. 257 Within four months of the filing of Gill, some
of the plaintiffs received relief. 258 The U.S. State Department
announced a change in policy regarding the issuance of passports to
people who had changed their names after marrying someone of the
same-sex. 259 Further, opponents to the Respect of Marriage Act of 2009,
including Representative Frank, believe the legal challenge filed against
DOMA in Gill stands the best chance of overturning the law. 260
On March 3, 2009, the Gill case was filed. 261 It was the first
concerted, multi-plaintiff legal challenge to section 3 of DOMA. Each
plaintiff in Gill was validly married in Massachusetts. The complaint
alleged that, although the federal government does not license marriages,
federal “programs take marital status into account in determining
eligibility for federal protections, benefits and responsibilities.” 262 The
complaint enumerated various federal programs where benefits have
been denied to same-sex couples under section 3 of the DOMA,
including spousal benefit programs such as survivor benefits, income tax
return status, and the ability to recover social security benefits. Similar
to the argument raised in Massachusetts, the Act required the
responsible parties to make false statements on governmental forms by
stating they are not married when they were in fact legally married in
Massachusetts.
The plaintiffs in Gill argued that by 2004, there were 1138 federal
laws that tied benefits, protections, or responsibilities to marital status.263
In the absence of DOMA, the plaintiffs would be granted these rights.
The complaint highlighted the rationales espoused at the time DOMA

257. See generally Cain, supra note 20.
258. Denise Lavoie, Gay Couples Can Use Married Names on Passports, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
June 19, 2009, available at http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=7882608.
259. Id. See also Same-Sex Couples Apply for Passport in Married Names, GAY & LESBIAN
ADVOC. & DEFENDERS (June 22, 2009), http://www.glad.org/current/pr-detail/same-sex-couplesapply-for-passport-in-married-names/. The Department of State amended the Foreign Affairs
Manual to provide for issuance of passports in a new name based on a legal name change
recognized under state law. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 1111 (2009),
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf.
260. Kerry Eleveld, Respect for Marriage Act Debuts, ADVOCATE.COM, Sept. 15, 2009,
http://www.advocate.com/printarticle.aspx?id=98544.
261. Amended Complaint, Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass.
2010) (No. 1:09-cv-10309), 2009 WL 5803677 [hereinafter Amended Complaint].
262. Id. ¶ 3.
263. Id. ¶ 54.
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was enacted. 264 In the Official House Report, 265 there are four reasons
for the delineation of same-sex married couples and opposite-sex
married couples: (1) House Bill 3396 advances the government’s
interest in defending and nurturing the institution of traditional
heterosexual marriage; (2) House Bill 3396 advances the government’s
interest in defending the traditional notions of morality; (3) House Bill
3396 advances the government’s interest in protecting state sovereignty
and democratic self-governance; and (4) House Bill 3396 advances the
government’s interest in preserving scarce government resources.
As the plaintiffs articulated effectively, the first two rationales were
not designed to protect any government interest, but, rather, are a
codification of animus concepts. In fact, the statement that the
government has a long-standing interest in defining marriage falls flat
given the lack of any legislation prior to 1996 reflecting this interest.
“Discrimination for its own sake is not a legitimate purpose upon which
disadvantageous classifications may be imposed.” 266
Reflected in both Massachusetts v. United States and the case at
hand, rationale three, the protection of state sovereignty, is actually
subverted by DOMA. The state actually becomes an instrumentality of
discrimination because of DOMA. This hits at the core of our concepts
of federalism.
Rationale four fails pursuant to the follow-up study by the
Congressional Budget Office in July 2004. In actuality, the recognition
of same-sex couples will increase the federal revenues through 2014.
Both Massachusetts cases point out this mistake-of-fact.
D.

District Court Opinions

On July 8, 2010, the District Court of Massachusetts decided both
Gill and Commonwealth of Massachusetts. 267 The court held that
DOMA violated both the Tenth and Fifth Amendments of the
Constitution. 268 In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts case, the court
granted summary judgment after determining that DOMA fails the
rational basis review. 269

264. See generally id.
265. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010), H.R. REP. NO. 104-664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905.
266. Amended Complaint, supra note 261, ¶ 62.
267. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass.
2010); Gill v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
268. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
269. Id. at 252.
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First, the court addressed the Tenth Amendment claim that a
determination of marital status is within the purview of the State. 270 In
the court’s opinion, the only permissible regulatory action the federal
government may take related to family law is in an enumerated federal
Therefore, DOMA would need to have an express
power. 271
jurisdictional element. The government contended that the Spending
Clause of the Constitution was such an element. 272
The court agreed with the Commonwealth’s counterargument that
Spending Clause legislation must satisfy five elements, of which DOMA
runs afoul. 273 The court focused on the fourth requirement, that the
power must not be used to induce States to engage in unconstitutional
activities, e.g., violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 274
The Court then addressed the companion case, Gill, 275 in which it
held that DOMA violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 276 The court stated that DOMA “plainly conditions the
receipt of federal funding on the denial of marriage-based benefits to
same-sex married couples, though the same benefits are provided to
similarly-situated heterosexual couples.” 277 The court went through the
four factors of DOMA and determined that they fail the rational
relationship. 278 The court pointed out that since the four stated
legislative reasons failed and any current justifications were just as
tenuous, DOMA violated the Equal Protection Clause. 279 Since DOMA
imposes an unconstitutional condition on receipt of federal funding, it
thus violates the Spending Power exception. 280

270. Id. at 245-46.
271. Id. at 246.
272. Id. at 246.
273. Id. at 247 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); quoting NeivesMarquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 128 (1st Cir. 2003)) (stating that the five requirements are:
(1) pursuit of the general welfare; “(2) conditions of funding must be imposed unambiguously, so
states are cognizant of the consequences of their participation; (3) conditions must not be ‘unrelated
to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs’ funded under the challenged
legislation; (4) the legislation must not be barred by other constitutional provisions; and (5) the
financial pressure created by the conditional grant of federal funds must not rise to the level of
compulsion.”).
274. Id. at 248.
275. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010).
276. Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
277. Id.
278. Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388. The four factors being: “(1) encouraging responsible
procreation and child-bearing; (2) defending and nurturing the institution of traditional heterosexual
marriage; (3) defending traditional notions of morality; and (4) preserving scarce resources.” Id.
279. Id. at 390, 397.
280. Massachusetts, 698 F.Supp.2d at 248-49.
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V. DIFFUSION THEORY AND DOMA
In Florida, the early majority has adopted the message regarding
same-sex capacity for adoption. Through revisions in the innovation
stage with the social research to support the conclusions, same-sex
couples were able to successfully challenge the prohibition on
“homosexual” adoption. Advocates were able to empathize with the
counter position. They utilized statistics rather than theoretical attacks
to undermine the position.
Examining the current legal challenges through the aforementioned
lens, it appears that the current tactic taken in Gill and Smelt are still in
the innovation stage. New arguments in current legal challenges are
being set forth that are still in the early stages of refinement. However,
there is an existing methodology for the successful equal protection
challenge to DOMA.
The lesson learned from Diffusion Theory is that the most difficult
portion of setting forth an argument is to have your message adopted. It
is quite challenging to move from the innovation stage to the early
adoption stage. Once in the adoption stage, the question will be how
many people will adopt the message.
In examination of the recent Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
positions for the Gill and Smelt cases, it becomes apparent that even the
DOJ believes that DOMA will be decided under the rational basis test.
If that is the case, then there is a clear road map to challenge DOMA
from the Florida adoption cases. This road map has been tested and
refined from the innovation stage. The question that remains is if it can
be moved to the Late Majority.
A.

Change and Empathy

Why is the legal recognition of same-sex couples’ rights important?
It is often argued that the sole reason for the necessity of this legal
recognition is for social acceptance. 281 However, that portion of the
issue is tangential to the core discussion, which is that, without formal
recognition of relationship status, basic rights will be denied to same-sex
couples. 282 For example, without this recognition, there is no right to

281. Richard Stith, On the Legal Validation of Sexual Relationships, in THE JURISPRUDENCE
FitzGibbon, Lynn D. Wardle &
A. Scott Loveless eds., 2009).
282. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Separate, Unequal: How Civil Unions Fall Short of Marriage,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 10, 2005, available at www.law.yale.edu/news/2432.htm (stating that
there are at least five reasons why civil union rights are substantially different than equal marriage
OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 143-64 (Scott
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inherit from a partner; there is no right to enter a partner’s hospital room;
and there is no right to continue to raise a partner’s children.
One additional facet describing why recognition is needed, and to
some degree inevitable, is the story of Janice Langbehn and Lisa
Pond. 283 The following account is a summary from newspaper articles
and court filings.
Janice Langbehn and Lisa Pond were about to depart from Miami
on a family cruise with three of their four children to celebrate the
couple’s eighteen years together. 284 Before they could start this family
celebration, Lisa suddenly collapsed after suffering a stroke.285 She was
taken to Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami. 286
As soon as they arrived at the hospital, things started to go awry.
Hospital workers refused to let Janice into Lisa’s hospital room. 287 They
claimed that she was not related. 288
Janice, undeterred, obtained her durable health care power of
attorney. 289 Most likely, attorneys told her that in the event of such an
emergency, this document would allow her to have access to her longtime partner. Yet, even after Janice produced a durable health care
power of attorney, the hospital refused to accept information from Janice
regarding Lisa. 290

rights, including recognition of the marriage/union by other states, the qualification of employer
benefits, and the 1138 federal protections available to married couples).
283. Langbehn v. Pub. Health Trust of Miami-Dade Cnty., 661 F. Supp. 2d. 1326 (S.D. Fla.
2009). See generally Mike Clary & Bob LaMendola, Lawsuit: Jackson Memorial Barred Lesbian
from Seeing Dying Partner, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, June 26, 2008; John Dorschner, Jackson
Memorial Hospital Employees Deny Anti-Gay Bias in Janice Langbehn Case, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 24, 2009, available at http://miamiherald.typepad.com/gaysouthflorida/2009/11/jacksonmemorial-hospital-employees-deny-anti-gay-bias-in-janice-langbehn-case.html; Tara Parker-Pope,
No Visiting Rights for Hospital Trauma Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, available at
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/tag/janice-langbehn; Tara Parker-Pope, Kept From a Dying Partner’s
TIMES,
May
19,
2009,
available
at
Bedside,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/health/19well.html?_r=1.
284. Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 1331.
285. Id. at 1332.
286. Id. at 1331.
287. Id. at 1332.
288. Id. at 1331-32 (“The admitting clerk, who controlled family members’ access to
emergency personnel attending patients at Ryder, rejected Ms. Langbehn’s offer to provide
information about Ms. Pond. She also refused to provide Ms. Langbehn with information about Ms.
Pond’s condition, and over the next eight hours, denied the family the ability to see or be with Ms.
Pond.”).
289. Id. at 1332. About one hour after Ms. Pond arrived at the hospital, a faxed copy of the
power of attorney arrived. Id.
290. Id.
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Janice claimed that the hospital employee then told her that she was
in an antigay city and that she would have to go to court on Monday to
enforce her rights. 291 Lisa suffered the stroke on a Saturday, and it was
not likely that she would survive to Monday. 292 According to Janice,
she was only allowed to see Lisa for a few minutes when the priest gave
Lisa her last rites. 293
Hospital officials said that they followed state and federal laws on
patient privacy. 294 They claimed that those laws forbid the release of
health information to those outside the patient’s immediate family. 295
The hospital added that, regardless of the patient privacy laws, there is
no legal requirement to allow visitors. 296
However, national standards for hospital accreditation allow
visitation to family members; people not legally related are considered
family members if they play a significant role in the patient’s life.297
Even if Janice and Lisa were legally married, Florida, under DOMA,
would not have to recognize that union, and they would have been in the
same position that they were in that tragic night.298
This type of uncertainty is not limited to Florida or to individuals
who are unable to articulate their rights. 299 In the recent American
Association of Law Schools (“AALS”) annual meeting held in New
Orleans, AALS thought it necessary to send an e-mail to the attendees of
the conference. Who, one may ask, were the attendees? Law professors.

291. Id. The hospital social worker told her that she was in an “anti-gay city and state.” Id.
292. Ms. Langbehn passed away that day. Id. at 1333.
293. Id. at 1333.
294. Id. at 1336 (“Much of a patient’s medical information is private and confidential under
both state and federal law, and I do not believe that the Florida Supreme Court would impose a duty
in tort on doctors or hospitals to provide medical updates on patient’s condition or prognosis or
treatment to third parties who would simply like to be kept informed.”). See also Clary &
LaMendola, supra note 283 (“The hospital follows state and federal laws on patient privacy that can
forbid the releasing health information to those outside the patient’s immediate family.”).
295. Langbehn, 661 F. Supp. 2d. at 1336.
296. Id. at 1337-38 (“[D]ecisions as to visitation should be left to the medical personnel in
charge of the patient, without second-guessing by juries and courts. A trauma unit is not like a
regular hospital setting, and visitors may interfere with what medical personnel are trying to
accomplish in a difficult environment . . . .”). See also Clary & LaMendola, supra note 283; ParkerPope, supra note 283.
297. See generally THE JOINT COMMISSION, THE PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO THE JOINT
COMMISSION’S HOSPITAL STANDARDS AND ACCREDITATION PROCESS, available at
http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Physicians%20guide%20WEB1.PDF.
298. See Dorschner, supra note 283 (“Jackson officials note that state law not only doesn’t
recognize same-sex relationships, but also has no provisions for unmarried heterosexual couples
without powers of attorney.”).
299. See also Reed v. ANM Health Care, 147 Wash. App. 1044 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)
(involving a hospital that required same-sex partner to leave partner’s room).
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AALS thought it necessary to tell law professors at their annual
convention that, should an “attendee experience a hospital refusing
access (to the patient) to the patient’s partner, or refusing the partner
access to the patient's hospital doctors, or if hospital personnel are
reluctant to recognize a power of attorney, we are providing the
following list of individuals who are available to assist you.” 300 If law
professors are unable to enforce legal rights, how could Ms. Langbehn
and Ms. Pond? The next logical question is why should there be a
difference?
The acceleration and dynamic change in the manner in which
information is disseminated, found, read, and weighed in on by experts
has dramatically changed in the last twenty years. To better understand
DOMA and the other animus-styled legislation and how different society
is today from 1977 or 1997, we need to return to the late 1970s first, and
then to the late 1990s. Once there, one is better able to appreciate the
tone of the discussion regarding fundamental fairness and same-sex
couples. Moreover, it can demonstrate far the country has tipped.
1. The Ellen Effect
Polls show that over 67% of Americans say same-sex couples
should be allowed to marry or have a civil union. 301 In Washington,
73% of voters support legal recognition of same-sex unions. 302 More to
the point, there is a large generational divide on the polls—many more
young people support same-sex marriage. 303 This generational gap can
best be explained by briefly exploring the career of Ellen DeGeneres.
If an average American can begin to relate to a person of the
LGBTI community, the cultural bias disappears. No longer are they
“theys,” but rather someone whom we invite into our home every day.
The career of Ellen DeGeneres seems to mirror the rise and, in my
opinion, fall of statutory discriminatory legislation against the LGBTI

300. Email from Susan Weterberg Prager to attendees of AALS annual meeting (Dec. 28,
2009) (on file with author).
301. Brian Montopoli, Poll: Support for Same Sex Marriage Grows, CBS NEWS, Apr. 27,
2009, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-4972643-503544.html.
302. The Washington Poll, Public Policy Attitudes: Iraq, Immigration, Same-Sex Marriage . . .,
(Nov. 10, 2007), http://www.washingtonpoll.org/results.html. Admittedly, this poll only utilizes a
sample of 700 registered voters. Id.
303. Paul Steinhauser, CNN Poll: Generations Disagree on Same-Sex Marriage, CNN.COM,
May 4 2009, available at, http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/05/04/samesex.marriage.poll/. But among
those 18 to 34 years old, 58% said same-sex marriages should be legal. Id. That number drops to
42% among respondents aged 35 to 49, and to 41% for those aged 50 to 64. Id. Only 24% of
Americans 65 and older support recognizing same-sex marriages, according to the poll. Id.
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community. Her career has mirrored the economic diffusion model
theory: 304 first she was an Innovator, 305 then she was an Early
Adaptor, 306 then the Early and Late Majority followed her, 307 concluding
with the Laggards. 308
Ellen DeGeneres has had an incredible career by any measurement.
She made it to the top of the stand-up comedy circuit, appearing on the
Tonight Show in 1986. 309 She was so successful that she became the
first female comedian that Johnny “called over” after her set to talk on
screen. 310
By 1994, as was the case with many comics at that time, a prime
time television show was developed based on her stand-up material. 311
The sitcom Ellen launched on ABC in 1994. 312 Then in 1997, Ellen
DeGeneres did the unthinkable at the time, and, along with the character
on the show, made her homosexuality public. 313
Ellen appeared on the cover of Time magazine on April 14, 1997, 314
and then on The Oprah Winfrey Show in February 1997, and announced
that she was a homosexual. 315 A couple of weeks later, 316 on the Ellen
304. See GLADWELL, supra note 12, at 196.
305. She was adventurous—her coming out on her ABC sitcom. See infra notes 313-321 and
accompanying text.
306. Dreamworks cast her in Finding Nemo and a daytime talk show. See infra notes 327-328
and accompanying text.
307. Her show became a success. See infra note 329 and accompanying text.
308. No one even mentioned she was gay when she was hired to be the fourth judge on
American Idol. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
ELLEN
DEGENERES
SHOW,
309. See
Ellen
DeGeneres
Bio,
THE
http://ellen.warnerbros.com/about/bio.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2010);
Ellen DeGeneres:
Snapshot, PEOPLE.COM, http://www.people.com/people/ellen_degeneres (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
310. Id. See also Proust Questionnaire, Ellen DeGeneres, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 2007, available
at http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2007/03/proust_degeneres200703.
311. See generally Seinfeld: TV Series 1990-1998, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0098904/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011); Rosanne: TV Series 1988–1997,
THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0094540/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2011).
312. See Ellen:
TV Series 1994–1998, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0108761/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
313. Ellen:
The Puppy Episode Part 1, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0570077/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
314. See Bruce Handy, Elizabeth Bland, William Tynan & Jeffrey Ressner, Television: Roll
Apr.
14,
1997,
available
at
Over,
Ward
Cleaver,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,986188,00.html. See also Time Magazine
Apr.
14,
1997,
available
at
Cover,
TIME,
http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19970414,00.html.
315. See Ellen DeGeneres Bio, supra note 309; see Ellen DeGeneres, Facebook Profile,
http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=137914105150#!/pages/EllenDegeneres/36772172240 (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
316. Ellen DeGeneres Bio, supra note 309.
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show, her character came out in the famous “Puppy Episode.” 317 The
episode was the highest rated episode of Ellen ever, drawing some 46
million viewers, 318 garnering an Emmy for Best Comedy writing, 319 a
Peabody Award, 320 and a ranking of 46 in T.V. Guide’s “TV’s Top 100
Episodes of All Time.” 321
However, not all was roses for Ellen. There was predictable
backlash in 1997 America. The Reverend Jerry Falwell came out
publicly against the airing of the episode. 322 Affiliates refused to air the
program. 323 Advertisers like Wendy’s stopped running ads on the Ellen
show. 324 Then, in the final season of 1998, ABC ran each episode with a
parental advisory warning. 325 Shows that had so-called “gay” actions
did not have the same label because they were heterosexuals poking
fun. 326 Compare this to the 1996 enactment of DOMA, and the mores of
society come into greater focus.
Ellen’s career moved forward slowly until 2003, when everything
started to hit for her. First, she starred in the widely successful animated
feature, Finding Nemo. 327 Then, she launched a daytime talk show, The

317. See The Puppy Episode, supra note 313.
318. See Ellen DeGeneres Bio, supra note 309 .
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. TV Guide‘s Top 100 Episodes of All Time, TV GUIDE, June 15, 2009.
322. Handy et al., supra note 314; Jess Cagle, As Gay As It Gets?, ENT. WKLY., May 8, 1998,
available at http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,282999,00.html.
323. Bob Lapham, Petition Being Circulated Against Showing of “Ellen” Episode, ABILENE
REP.-NEWS, Nov. 18, 2008, available at http://www.texnews.com/local97/ellen041597.html. ABC
affiliate WBMA-LP in Birmingham, Alabama, citing “family values,” first sought ABC’s
permission to move the episode out of prime-time to a late-night slot. Id. When ABC declined the
request, the affiliate refused to air the episode at all. Id.
324. KATHLEEN TRACY, ELLEN: THE REAL STORY OF ELLEN DEGENERES 251-52 (2005).
325. Cagle, supra note 322; James Collins, Television: Ellen DeGeneres: Yep, She’s Still Gay,
TIME, Oct. 27, 1997, available at http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,987260,00.html.
326. DAVID EHRENSTEIN, OPEN SECRET (GAY HOLLYWOOD 1928–1998) 315 (1998).
DeGeneres further noted what she believed to be hypocrisy on the part of ABC, citing episodes of
ABC series The Drew Carey Show and Spin City that included two men kissing (the Carey episode
was even promoted using the kiss). “There’s no disclaimer on [the Carey show] at all, because it’s
two heterosexual men, and they’re making fun of heterosexuality . . . [Spin City aired without a
disclaimer] ‘because neither (Michael J. Fox nor Michael Boatman) is really gay in real life.’” Id.
See also Cagle, supra note 322.
327. Finding Nemo (2003), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, available at
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0266543/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
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Ellen DeGeneres Show. 328 In its first season, the show was nominated
for eleven Emmy Awards and won four, including Best Talk Show. 329
By 2003, the comedian whose show was cancelled for being “too
gay” was now the darling of Middle America. We never hear of protests
of her show because she is gay, nor do we hear of parental advisory
warnings or of affiliates failing to air the show. Is it a surprise then that
in 2003, the proposed constitutional amendment to make DOMA
permanent never got anywhere?
By 2006, Ellen was hosting the Oscars 330 and appearing in
American Express commercials. 331 The biggest news may have been her
appearance as the new judge on American Idol. She replaced Paula
Abdul in the number one show on television. 332 Should it be a surprise
that in 2009 same-sex marriage was recognized in twelve states?
2. Department of Justice Actions
During the summer of 2009, the DOJ, in making motions to dismiss
the various cases challenging DOMA, made a radical turn of policy.
The Obama administration 333 was forced into filing a usual brief in
federal court defending the DOMA. 334 The DOJ stated that it must
defend laws under legal challenges even though the Department
“disagrees with a particular statute as a policy matter, as it does here.”

328. Ellen: The Ellen DeGeneres Show (2003-???), THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0379623/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
329. Ellen: The Ellen DeGeneres Show Awards, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0379623/awards (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
330. Lloyd de Vries, Producer Says Comedian “Was Born to Host the Academy Awards,”
(Sept.
8,
2006),
CBSNEWS.COM
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/08/entertainment/main1984991.shtml.
331. Ellen DeGeneres Bio, supra note 309.
332. Id.; see also Ellen DeGeneres Joins American Idol as Fourth Judge, AMERICAN IDOL
(Sept. 9, 2009), http://www.americanidol.com/news/view/pid/1841/.
333. The administration is on record advocating the repeal of DOMA. See Press Release,
Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Presidential Memorandum on
Federal Benefits and Non-Discrimination, and Support of the Lieberman-Baldwin Benefits
Legislation (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statementby-the-President-on-the-Presidential-Memorandum-on-Federal-Benefits-and-Non-Discriminationand-Support-of-the-Lieberman-Baldwin-Benefits-Legislation/ (“I stand by my long-standing
commitment to work with Congress to repeal the so-called Defense of Marriage Act. It’s
discriminatory, it interferes with States’ rights, and it’s time we overturned it.”).
334. See John Schwartz, National Briefing|Washington; U.S. Defends Marriage Law, N.Y.
Sept.
19,
2009,
available
at
TIMES,
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C05E2D61539F93AA2575AC0A96F9C8B63&ref
=john_schwartz.
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According to Robert Raben, 335 the brief was “a really startling political
and policy statement.”
a. June 2009—Smelt v. United States
The first brief filed by the DOJ under the Obama administration
was in the case of Smelt v. United States. 336 It was much anticipated
because, during the prior election, then-Senator Obama said he thought
that DOMA should be repealed. However, that was not the approach the
DOJ took in the brief.
In Smelt, the plaintiffs were validly married in California. 337 They
were seeking redress in court to be treated equally with respect to federal
benefits and protections. 338 In response to the case, the DOJ followed
the Bush administration’s “play book,” despite most of the arguments
being rejected by many state supreme courts as legally unsound and
discriminatory. 339 The DOJ won the motion to dismiss on the easy
ground of lack of standing. 340 The married couple had not alleged any
specific harm suffered related to DOMA.
However, what was disturbing about the brief was the addition of a
new argument suggesting that the federal government should maintain
neutrality in the treatment of same-sex couples. 341 The government
argued that neutrality would ensure that federal tax money collected
from states that do not recognize same-sex couples will not be utilized to
assist same-sex couples in the states that recognize the unions. 342
Moreover, the DOJ promoted arguments regarding the preservation of
scarce resources that had been clearly demonstrated as inaccurate by
prior study. 343 The merits of the argument, or lack thereof, 344 are not as

335. Schwartz, supra note 334. Robert Rafen was a legislative consultant who worked at the
Justice Department under President Clinton. Id.
336. Smelt v. United States, SACV-09-00286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/19078745/Order-Granting-Defendants-Motion-to-Dismiss-in-Defenseof-Marriage-Act-Lawsuit.
337. Id. at 1.
338. Id. at 2.
339. See generally Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Smelt, SACV-09-00286 (C.D. Cal. Sept.
24, 2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/16355867/Obamas-Motion-to-DismissMarriage-case.
340. Smelt, SACV-09-00286, at 3.
341. See Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 33, Smelt, SACV-09-00286.
342. Id. at 45.
343. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE POTENTIAL BUDGETARY IMPACT OF RECOGNIZING SAMEMARRIAGES
(2004),
available
at
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/55xx/doc5559/06-21SEX
samesexmarriage.pdf.
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important as the fact that the DOJ was attempting to further the cause of
DOMA, rather than recognize the faults therein.
b. September 2009—Gill v. Office of Personnel Management
What a difference three months make. As expected in the case of
Gill v. Office of Personnel Management, 345 the DOJ filed a motion to
dismiss. Reading the Gill brief compared to the Smelt brief, one would
not have known they were prepared and filed within three months of
each other, let alone within the same year.
This time around in Gill, the DOJ first acknowledged that the
Obama Administration does not support DOMA as a matter of policy
and believes that it is discriminatory and supports its repeal. 346 Only
then did the DOJ make specific standing arguments as to some of the
plaintiffs and the general constitutional defenses. The DOJ put forth the
argument that LGBT discrimination should be scrutinized under the
“rational basis” test as a result of Romer v. Evans, and, thus, there was a
rational basis for Congress to pass the DOMA. 347 Further, in the “don’t
ask don’t tell” case in Massachusetts, 348 the Supreme Court did not
adopt a higher standard. Obviously, the crux of that appeal will be on
whether or not Romer should be limited to the anti-gay legislation in
Amendment 2 from Colorado and a higher standard of review applied.
More interesting than the future contest to be played out in the Gill
appeal, there has been another degradation of the four underpinnings of
DOMA. In footnote ten 349 of its brief, the DOJ did not justify DOMA
on the “responsible procreation and child-rearing” theory. 350 This was
the theory most heavily relied on in recent same-sex marriage cases. 351
The DOJ recognized that this theory is no longer valid.

344. The government does not address the fact that same-sex couples also contribute to the tax
base yet they are denied the benefits that corresponding heterosexuals receive. It is difficult to
reconcile an argument about public expenditures when everyone is contributing to that base.
345. Amended Complaint, supra note 261.
346. DOJ Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 1, Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2009) (No. 1:09-cv-10309), 2009 WL 5803678.
347. Id. at 16.
348. Cook v. Rumsfeld, 429 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Mass. 2006).
349. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 346, n.10.
350. In the legislative history of DOMA, the “purported interests in ‘responsible procreation
and child-rearing’—that is, the assertions that (1) the government’s interest in ‘responsible
procreation’ justifies limiting marriage to a union between one man and one woman, and (2) that the
government has an interest in promoting the raising of children by both of their biological parents.”
Id. at 19 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12-13, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2916-17).
351. See, e.g., Lockyer v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 95 P.3d 459 (Cal. 2004); Lewis v.
Alfaro, No. S122865, 2004 WL 473258 (Cal. 2004); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d
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Citing the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Psychological Association, the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, and the American Medical Association, among
others, the DOJ concluded that the underpinnings of one of the tenets of
the DOMA are incorrect.
[M]any leading medical, psychological, and social welfare
organizations have issued policies opposing restrictions on lesbian and
gay parenting upon concluding, based on numerous studies, that
children raised by gay and lesbian parents are as likely to be welladjusted as children raised by heterosexual parents. 352

Further, the footnote finds support for this conclusion with Justice
Scalia in the dissent in Lawrence v. Texas. 353 In Lawrence, Justice
Scalia pointed out that encouraging procreation would not be a rational
basis for limiting same-sex couples’ marriage because the “sterile and
elderly are allowed to marry.” 354
B.

Four Parts of DOMA

DOMA has two substantive parts. Section 2 allows states to ignore
laws or policies from other states, the reverse of the full faith and credit
concept. Section 3 defines marriage for federal purposes as a union
between a man and a woman. In the Official House Report, there are
four reasons for the delineation of same-sex married couples and
opposite-sex married couples: (1) House Bill 3396 advances the
government’s interest in “defending and nurturing the institution of
traditional, heterosexual marriage”; (2) House Bill 3396 advances the
government’s interest in “defending the traditional notions of morality”;
(3) House Bill 3396 advances the governments interest in “protecting
state sovereignty and democratic self governance”; and (4) House Bill
3396 advances the government’s interest in “preserving scarce
government resources.” 355 Using the Florida adoption cases and
Diffusion Theory as our guide, can DOMA withstand rational basis
scrutiny? 356
374 (D. Mass. 2009); Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
234 (D. Mass. 2010).
352. DOJ Memorandum, supra note 346, at 19.
353. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
354. Id. at 605.
355. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010), H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 12 (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
356. After the article was completed the District Court in Gill was decided. The Gill court
agreed with the following analysis. However, the Gill case has yet to be appealed and is only one
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1. Government’s Interest in Defining Marriage
The argument that, through DOMA, the government is promoting
some form of traditional marriage seems straightforward and, to some
degree, has a superficial appeal. 357 “A specific tradition sought to be
maintained cannot be an important governmental objective for equal
protection purposes, however, when the tradition is nothing more than
the historical classification currently expressed in the statute being
challenged.” 358 In other words, the argument would exist as a marry-goround, that the discriminatory concept is both the basis for legislation
and the purpose of the legislation. 359
Essentially, Congress, through DOMA, is saying that marriage is
limited to opposite-sex couples. This type of analysis is hollow,
especially because not all Judeo-Christian cultures prohibit same-sex
marriage. 360 In fact, within our own country, five states allow marriage
of same-sex couples. This argument allows the classification to be made
for its own sake. 361 Traditional discriminatory principles should not be
permitted under the rational basis test. So, can the first two
classifications be justified by any other plausible legislative reasons?
In the Florida cases, the adoption standard was based on similar
principles displaying animus. In order to overcome this portion of the
statute, the challengers to the Florida cases presented the legislative
record to demonstrate that the underlying principle was animus-like in
nature. The Florida record was full of animus-based statements, 362
including such classics as “let them go back into the closet.” 363
By 1997, congressmen had learned how to couch the animus-based
Regardless, the record still
statements in political rhetoric. 364
demonstrates the misguided reliance on the farce of the sanctity of
marriage. 365 After all, how can civil (not religious) marriage suffer if

federal district court decision. Nonetheless, this discussion demonstrates that the applied theory
appears to be correct.
357. See also Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 898 (Iowa 2009).
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Same-sex marriage currently is legal in Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South
Africa, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and Iceland. In 1997, none of these countries allowed same-sex
unions.
361. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
362. See supra Part III.A.
363. See supra Part III.A.
364. See supra Part III.A.
365. But even from a religious prospective, not all religions prohibit same-sex marriage. One
part of the Lutheran church permits same-sex unions. See Christopher Quinn, Same-Sex Unions
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same-sex marriage were allowed? Actually, there can be a counterpoint
made. There is an approach that challenges the very ethics of
marriage. 366 One does not drink from a whites-only water fountain, so
why do individuals engage in marriage when it has the same
discriminatory effects? 367 The likelihood that people will no longer
marry is slight. The likelihood that a majority of the voting populates
will demand equality appears much higher.
This is where the concept of the government’s object to protect the
religious institution of marriage appears. What morality would the
government be protecting other than a religious definition of marriage?
After all, if we are speaking of just marriage, how is the marriage of two
atheists different from that of a same-sex couple? The wording is just an
end-around from a direct statement of religious marriage.
It may be argued that there are other moral rationales for marriage
restrictions, such as procreation or child rearing. The issue for a rational
basis analysis is whether there is any legitimate state interest for the
legislation. If there are basically three ways that the first two sections
could meet a rational basis standard: (1) procreation; (2) child-rearing;
and (3) religion, then we should review how these similar justifications
were attacked under the rational basis standard.
In the DOJ brief in Gill, the government conceded that procreation
and child rearing are not justifications that would survive rational basis
scrutiny as applied to DOMA. Nonetheless, it is important to briefly
analyze why this is true, and why Diffusion Theory can show us how to
apply the successful argument to the morality principle. Finally,
although the issue has been conceded in a brief, this is not conclusive as
a matter of law.
In Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence, 368 he pointed out that
encouraging procreation was not a rational basis for limiting same-sex
couples’ marriage. He clearly articulated that this rationale would fail
Accepted by Evangelical Lutherans, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 21, 2009, available at
http://www.ajc.com/news/same-sex-unions-accepted-120999.html.
366. IAN AYRES & JENNIFER GERARDA BROWN, STRAIGHTFORWARD: HOW TO MOBILIZE
HETEROSEXUAL SUPPORT FOR GAY RIGHTS 162 (2005).
367. Id. The question being posited—is it moral
To join the Boy Scouts when they refuse to appoint gay scout masters
To join the military when they refuse to allow openly gay soldiers
To attend a church that refuses to ordain gay priests
To take a job from an employer that refuses to give equal employment benefits
To adopt a child from a state that bars same-sex parents from adopting, or
To join a club that refuses to admit gay members?
Id.
368. 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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because “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.” 369 Therefore,
procreation seems unlikely to survive a rational basis attack.
Could child rearing survive the rational basis attack? Let’s look to
Diffusion Theory. Diffusion Theory tells us that the most effective way
to communicate an idea is to see if similar ideas have been adopted.
Here, we have a parallel between the first two justifications of the
DOMA and the Florida adoption laws. In Florida, the courts found
persuasive the use of the legislative record to attack the circular
reasoning of rational basis.
In Doe II, the court concluded that the state’s interest in providing a
stable permanent home environment was not served by a blanket
prohibition. Not one of the state’s arguments: (i) promoting the well
being of the children; 370 (ii) the social stigmatization of the children; 371
or (iii) morality, 372 met the rational basis test according to the Florida
court. In order to reach that conclusion, the medical and social research
had to catch up to the argument proffered by the advocates for same-sex
couple adoption.
The Florida court concluded that child rearing failed under all
medical and social science research. The evidence was overwhelming in
the Florida adoption cases. It would be hard to imagine that the research
of the AMA, the American Psychological Association, the American
Psychiatric Association, ad nauseum, would fail here. Thus, child
rearing should also fail a rational basis attack. As the Iowa Supreme
Court noted, “[t]he ban on same-sex civil marriage can only logically be
justified as a means to ensure the asserted optimal environment for
raising children if fewer children will be raised within same-sex
relationships or more children will be raised in dual-gender
marriages.” 373

369. Id.
370. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *28 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008) (“[T]o be considered
rationally related to a governmental interest, the distinctions between individuals may not be based
on unsubstantiated assumptions.”); id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973)) (“[H]ere, the evidence proves quite the contrary; homosexuals are no more susceptible to
mental health or psychological disorders, substance or alcohol abuse or relationship instability than
their heterosexual counterparts.”).
371. Id. (“[T]here is no optimal gender combination of parents.”).
372. Id. at *29 (“[P]ublic morality per se, disconnected from any separate legitimate interest, is
not a legitimate government interest to justify unequal treatment.”). The Department’s opinion that
homosexuality alone is immoral is unable to be reconciled with the permission of homosexual foster
parenting. Id. (“[T]here is no ‘morality’ interest with regard to one group of individuals permitted
to form the visage of a family in one context but prohibited in another.”).
373. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 901 (Iowa 2009).
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2. Government’s Interest in Defining Morality.
Although there is intended to be a separation of church and state, in
the Judeo-Christian framework of our legislative system, it is evident
that we often create laws that define our social values and norms. Can
morality then, alone, be enough to survive the rational basis test?
Two Supreme Court cases have addressed this issue. In Bowers,
Justice Stevens’ dissent stated that neither a majority’s moral opinion
nor tradition could protect a law from constitutional attack. 374
Moreover, as Justice O’Connor demonstrated, morality alone as a
justification encourages circular reasoning. “Moral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal
Protection Clause because legal classifications must not be drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.” 375
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court adopted Justice Stevens’ dissent in
Bowers, turning it into controlling authority. 376 Lawrence demonstrated
that a solely moral-based justification would not survive rational basis.
“[C]ourts cannot rely simply on reference to morality alone to ensure
that government action is nonarbitrary and free of impermissible
bias.” 377
Under the Lawrence framework, morality alone cannot be
justification for the DOMA statute. How can a religious concept of
marriage be a moral justification? These same rationales were used in
the past for interracial marriages. At one point, states were promoting
morality. However, the morality promoted had no rational basis to the
law that was established. Likewise here, morality is no justification. If
morality alone could be a justification, without more, then any type of
legislative initiative would be permissible.
Under Diffusion Theory principles, we can then look to how the
morality issue has been successfully attacked in the Florida adoption
cases and elsewhere. In Lofton, the innovation stage of the Florida
adoption cases, morality alone was held to be a sufficient justification.
374. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186, 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
375. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583, 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“A law branding one class of
persons as criminal based solely on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct
associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection
Clause, under any standard of review.”).
376. Jamie Iguchi, Satisfying Lawrence: The Fifth Circuit Strikes Ban on Sex Toy Sales, 43
U.C. DAVIS L. REV 655, 664 (2009).
377. For a discussion of scholarship on how morality and the law should be given effect, see
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v.
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1239 n.19 (2004).
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However, as the theory moved from the innovation stage to the early
adoption stage, the animus demonstrated in the legislative history played
a key role.
In Florida, the legislative history, plus the additional medical and
sociological evidence, proved decisive in preventing the state from
relying on morality alone. “[T]here is no ‘morality’ interest with regard
to one group of individuals permitted to form the visage or a family in
one context but prohibited in another.” 378 Clearly the animus in the
legislative history, plus the current medical science would seem to also
defeat DOMA on the rational basis ground on this rationale.
3. Government’s Interest in Protecting State Sovereignty.
“We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government,
subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” 379 The
Constitution protects the concept of dual sovereignty through the Tenth
Amendment. The Tenth Amendment articulates that powers not
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to
the states. 380 The states thus retain substantial sovereign authority under
our constitutional system. 381
In dealing with a constitutional issue implicating state sovereignty,
the Court generally will look to the powers delegated to Congress in
Article I. “If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the
Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to
the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the
Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress.” 382 Essentially, the Tenth Amendment “states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” 383

378. Doe II, 2008 WL 5006172, at *29 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 25, 2008)
379. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990).
380. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
381. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457–58 (1991) (“As James Madison put it:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).”).
382. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1991) (citing United States v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 643, 649 (1961)); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534 (1941).
383. Id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
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As for DOMA, the question regarding state sovereignty is whether
marriage is the purview of the federal government or the states. Family
law is traditionally a matter for the states. 384 “This is especially true
where a statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law
of domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.” 385
Congress is thus infringing on state sovereignty when a federal statute
refuses to recognize a valid state marriage unless it conforms to the
federal statute’s definition. DOMA does just this.
Because DOMA does appear to override state marriage law, will it
survive scrutiny and under what test? In an earlier case, state
sovereignty may be held to a higher standard than mere rational basis.
Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for
state interests, particularly in the field of family and family-property
arrangements. They should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state
interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied. 386

Based on the evidence surrounding DOMA, it would appear that
this higher standard should apply. Marriage is a family law issue
traditionally reserved for the states. By enacting DOMA, the federal
government is not protecting state sovereignty.
The purpose of this section of DOMA was to protect states from the
Full Faith and Credit Clause after Baehr. Professors Laurence Tribe and
Stanley Cox both argue that DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment. 387
“Tribe suggests that Congress does not have the power to ‘exempt’ a
narrow ‘category of judgments’ from the requirements of full faith and
credit.” 388
4. Government’s Interest in Protecting Scarce Resources.
In 1997, when DOMA was passed, no states had a law permitting
same-sex marriage. Further, there were no actual studies done to

384. See generally Wolff, supra note 25.
385. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
386. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
387. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School, to Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (May 24, 1996), in 142 CONG. REC. S5931-01, S5932-33 (daily ed. June 6, 1996)
[hereinafter Tribe Letter].
388. See Mark D. Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:
Lawrence, Full Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors That Determine What the
Constitution Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV 915, 939–40 (2006). Professor Rosen believes that Tribe
and Cox assume that DOMA violates the “Effects Clause” erroneously. Id.
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determine the economic impact of DOMA. 389 Thus, at its inception,
there could be, by definition, no rational basis for considering this
economic factor. Moreover, when there was research on the impact
done by the Congressional Budget Office, the research was inapposite in
supporting this factor.
In 2004, the Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”) 390 concluded
that
[t]he potential effects on the federal budget of recognizing same-sex
marriages are numerous. [ . . . ] In some cases, recognizing same sex
marriages would increase outlays and revenues; in other cases, it
would have the opposite effect. The Congressional Budget Office
estimates that on net, those impacts would improve the budget's
bottom line to a small extent: by less than $1 billion in each of the
next 10 years (CBO's usual estimating period). That result assumes
that same-sex marriages are legalized in all 50 states and recognized by
the federal government. 391

The CBO looked at all the impact to income tax revenues, estate tax
revenues, and effects on outlays. There was no discernable impact.
Therefore, protecting scarce government resources should fail the
rational basis test.
VI. CONCLUSION
This is not the first time DOMA has been challenged. 392 So what
has changed that resulted in these decisions? Diffusion Theory teaches

389. What was done was speculation.
I urge my colleagues to think of the potential cost involved here. How much is it going
to cost the Federal Government if the definition of “spouse” is changed? It is not a
matter of irrelevancy at all. It is not a matter of attacking anyone's personal beliefs or
personal activity. That is not my purpose here. What is the added cost in Medicare and
Medicaid benefits if a new meaning is suddenly given to these terms? I know I do not
have any reliable estimates of what such a change would mean, but then, I do not know
of anyone who does. That is the point—nobody knows for sure. I do not think, though,
that it is inconceivable that the costs associated with such a change could amount to
hundreds of millions of dollars, if not billions—if not billions—of Federal taxpayer
dollars.
142 CONG. REC. S1011 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
390. Conor Clarke, Gay Marriage and the Budget: Does DOMA Preserve “Scarce
Government Resources”? (No.), THE ATLANTIC, June 13, 2009, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/06/gay-marriage-and-the-budget-does-domapreserve-scarce-government-resources-no/19312/.
391. CBO report, supra note 343, at 1 (emphasis added).
392. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d. 862 (Iowa 2009); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt.,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2009).
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us that change happened in society and the late majority has adopted the
idea of same-sex marriage. 393 This same sequencing of change was
demonstrated by the Florida adoption cases. Diffusion Theory allows us
to demonstrate that social mores have moved. The majority has
empathized with the minority and adopted its position. This framing
becomes crucial for the continuing debate and legal challenges.
Over time, if the message is effectively communicated, the causal
connection between the statute and the purpose becomes tenuous. That
appears to be where we are with DOMA currently. The final question
seems to be whether there is enough empathy with the group seeking
redress to break the causal connection from a rational basis standard.
Have we tipped? Maybe so.

393. ROGERS, supra note 3, at 150.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol44/iss3/2

58

